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Managed Care Grievance Procedures: The Dilemma
And The Cure
By Judge Joyce Krutick Craig'
INTRODUCTION
As we enter the 21st century, the health care community (providers
and policy makers alike) must come to terms with the fact that managed
care, in one form or another, is here to stay.2 Accepting the fact that
health care costs, at present and in the future, will generally be paid for
on a capitated basis, 3 we must determine how to handle denials of
claims in order to adequately protect patients.
Patients and physicians feel equally frustrated and powerless when a
managed care organization refuses to pay for treatment.4 Managed care
organizations ("MCOs") consistently claim they are making payment
decisions rather than medical decisions in these situations. But the real-
ity is that, when a denial of coverage is made, it is the equivalent of a
I The author serves as a United States Administrative Law Judge assigned to the Social
Security Administration, and was Chief Judge of the Hartford, Connecticut Hearing Office
from September 2000 to September 2001. The opinions expressed in this paper are solely
that of the author and do not represent the policy of the Social Security Administration.
Judge Craig received her B.A. in history from Long Island University in 1969, her J.D. from
Brooklyn Law School in 1969, and is a candidate for an L.L.M. in Health Law and Policy at
Seton Hall University School of Law. Judge Craig gratefully acknowledges the assistance of
Judge John Mason and Mary Pappas in editing this work.
2. The term "managed care" is generally used to describe plans for payment of health
care costs that include mechanisms to control costs while attempting to provide quality ser-
vice. In most instances, prior authorization for service is required. Often the primary physi-
cian is a "gatekeeper." For an excellent discussion of the evolution of the term "managed
care," see Harold S. Luft, Why Are Physicians So Upset about Managed Care?, 24 J.
IHEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 957 (1999).
3. See Eleanor D. Kinney, Procedural Protections for Patients in Capitated Health
Plans, 22 AM. J. L. & MED. 301, 301 (1996).
4. This has become evident to this author on a daily basis during hearings conducted
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-22(g)(5) (1994). Medicare beneficiaries, who are enrolled in
health maintenance organizations, and their physicians, regularly express their frustration to
this author. Most do not understand why the HMO denies treatment and/or testing ordered
by the physician.
denial of care. 5  Physicians feel that their professional judgment has
been undermined and patients are angry and frightened because they
cannot secure the care that their doctors believe is necessary. 6 Both pa-
tients and physicians want control over medical decisions to be returned
to the treating physician. Managed care organizations argue that to do
so would undermine the cost saving benefits of managed care.
7
Scholars have authored many articles concerning the "backlash" in
managed care.8 This "backlash" is fueled by the numerous horror sto-
ries of patient deaths attributed to health care denials. The media rou-
tinely reports cases of exacerbated illnesses and death resulting from
claims that have been denied by MCOs. For example, Newsweek dis-
played a cover showing a woman in a hospital gown, fist clenched, with
an anguished look on her face, and the words "The War Over Patient's
Rights HIO HELL."9 A study by the Public Advocate of the City of
New York found that providers experience significant delays when they
attempt to secure pre-certification of services for their patients.' 0 Ex-
amples of the problem include the need for the physician to make multi-
ple phone calls before a pre-certification is issued. The physician must
deal with insurance plan staff who have no medical knowledge and in-
surer staff physicians whose expertise often lies in unrelated specialties.
Scholars suggest, among other things, amending the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act ("ERISA") 1 to allow lawsuits for negli-
gence, and creating a patients' bill of rights. Congress, in passing ER-
ISA, intended to protect employees who participated in private pension
plans by setting uniform standards. 12 Although Congress did not particu-
5. Recently, a bill introduced in the New Jersey Legislature took note of this fact, stat-
ing that in order to reduce the costs of care, many carriers have been denying medically nec-
essary treatment for patients. S.B. 1333, 209th Leg. (N.J. 2000).
6. Id.
7. See Brief of Amici Curiae Am. Assn. of Health Plans at 3, Pegram v. Herdrich, 530
U.S. 211 (2000) (No. 98-1949).
8. See Norman Daniels & James Sabin, The Ethics of Accountability in Managed Care
Reform, HEALTH AFF. Sept.-Oct. 1998, at 50 (suggesting accountability as a key to reform
health care); see also Thomas Rice, The Mechanics of Backlash: The Microregulation of the
Health Care Marketplace, 24 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 967 (1999).
9. The War Over Patient's Rights HMO HELL, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 8, 1999, cover.
10. Mark Green, Obstacle Course: How Managed Care Organizations Manage to De-
lay and Deny Heath Care (June 1999), at http://pubadvocate.nyc.gov/padcdetail.cfm?idl=
7&id2=81 (last visited Jan. 12, 2002).
11. 29 U.S.C. §§1001-1191(c) (1994).
12. Id.
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larly focus on health plans, much less managed care, 13 ERISA has had a
significant impact on the relationship between managed care plans and
their beneficiaries. The major thrust of ERISA was to pre-empt state law
that conflicted with the federal statutory scheme. 14 In 1999, seventy-
three percent of workers in the United States had health insurance pro-
vided through their employers (as part of an employee benefit plan as
defined by ERISA). 15 Therefore, the impact upon patients has been
enormous. Patients, injured when their MCO denied care, often sue for
negligence. These suits are generally brought in state courts. Such suits
are generally dismissed because ERISA limits the remedy; a patient may
sue for the cost of the services that have been denied or may sue to force
the MCO to provide care, but cannot sue for damages. 16 Thus, patients
find themselves without the ability to sue for damages due to negligence.
The New Jersey Legislature adopted a resolution asking Congress to
eliminate "certain statutory impediments ... to medical malpractice ac-
tions against ERISA plans maintained to provide health insurance."' 17
However, solutions of this nature do not address the crux of the problem,
getting the patient the care he or she needs when it is needed. The right
to sue for malpractice comes too late for many patients. 18
Remedies of this nature fail to take into account the fact that each
claim by a managed care entity involves a legal interpretation of the pol-
icy provisions, and application of those standards to medical facts. Be-
cause the issue is a mixed question of law and medicine, patients would
be best served by having their claims heard by federal administrative
law judges, who are skilled in both law and medicine.
At present, the only federal statute dealing with grievance procedures
has little value in protecting patients' rights. 19 Some MCOs have an in-
ternal review process, which may be required by state law. Some go
13. See Margaret G. Farrell, ERISA Pre-emption and Regulation of Managed Care: The
Case for Managed Federalism, 23 AM. J.L. & MED. 251, 251 (1997).
14. Id. at 252.
15. Contingent Workers Incomes and Benefits Lag Behind Those of Rest of Workforce,
MEDICAL BENEFITS, Aug. 30, 2000, Vol. 17, No. 6, at 5, available at http://www.senate.
gov/-kennedy/statements/00/07/2000725859.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2002).
16. This is known as ERISA pre-emption. See discussion infra Section I.
17. A.R. 49, 209th Leg. (N.J. 2000).
18. Even a suit under ERISA to force the plan to provide benefits under 29 U.S.C.
§1132(a)(1)(B) (1994) is not helpful, as a patient would have to sue the company (most
likely with the assistance of an attorney in federal court). Because lawsuits take time, the
patient may die in the interim or, at the very least, have their condition worsen.
19. 42 U.S.C. § 300(e) (1994) (commonly known as the Health Maintenance Organiza-
tion Act of 1973). See also infra Part II.
further, providing arbitration and/or other forms of independent review,
which also may be required by state law. Many states have enacted pro-
cedures that allow a patient to appeal adverse managed care decisions;
however, the statutes vary greatly in the protections afforded each pa-
tient. Some statutes only require that an MCO maintain grievance pro-
cedures. Others go to great lengths to detail review procedures. Such
procedures might include a review of the denial by company employees
(commonly termed "internal review"), a second review by company em-
ployees (commonly termed "reconsideration"), and an independent re-
view by a private independent review organization or a state agency
(commonly known as external review).
The President's Advisory Committee also recognized the need for
strong grievance procedures, 20 but a solution has yet to be proposed that
adequately protects patients. The difficulty with allowing each state to
formulate its own procedure is the lack of uniformity. Uniformity is
necessary to prevent a resident of one state, who suffers from the same
condition, requires the same care, and carries the same health insurance
as a resident of another state, from being denied the necessary care be-
cause one state has mandatory and binding external review, while the
other state does not. Moreover, people move from state to state for both
work and play. Often, they move to be near quality health care. For ex-
ample, if health care is provided in New York, but the individual resides
in New Jersey and works in Pennsylvania, which grievance procedure
controls? 21 The question has been posed: "Does the state managed care
regulation conflict with the effectuation of the acknowledged goals of
the federal legislation or unreasonably impede the free flow of com-
merce in employer provided health services? '' 22 I believe that such
regulation places a chokehold on the ability of patients to secure neces-
sary care.
This paper will focus on the procedures currently available for pa-
tients to appeal denials of claims, and will propose a unified federal
grievance procedure. The proposed procedure would utilize the talents
20. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CONSUMER PROTECTION & QUALITY IN THE HEALTH
CARE INDUSTRY, CONSUMER BILL OF RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES: REPORT To THE PRESI-
DENT OF THE UNITED STATES 57-62 (1997), available at
http://www.hcqualitycommission.gov/
cborr (last visited Jan. 12, 2002).
21. While traditional rules governing conflict of laws would be applied, court action
would be required to ascertain the answer.
22. Farrell, supra note 13, at 259.
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of the federal administrative judiciary assigned to the Social Security
Administration. These judges have expertise in both medicine and utili-
zation review resulting from their work adjudicating disability claims
and appeals of adverse Medicare determinations including: Part A hospi-
tal benefits; Part B physicians services, home health services, and provi-
sion of durable medical equipment; and the newly added Part C Medi-
care + Choice program. 23 Part I explores the implications of ERISA and
pre-emption of state actions for negligence. Part II discusses current
federal law and provides a state-by-state analysis of state appeals proce-
dures. Part III discusses the evolution of federalism and its application to
health care law. Part IV discusses existing proposals and pending legis-
lation dealing with grievance procedures. Part V proposes a statutory
federal due process hearing for appeals of managed care adverse deter-
minations.
I. ERISA
In 1974, Congress passed the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act. 24 The stated purpose for the passage of the Act, in pertinent part,
was:
The Congress finds that the growth in size, scope, and
numbers of employee benefit plans in recent years has
been rapid and substantial; that the operational scope and
economic impact of such plans is increasingly interstate;
that the continued well-being and security of millions of
employees and their dependents are directly affected by
these plans; that they are affected with a national public
interest; that they have become an important factor af-
fecting the stability of employment and the successful
development of industrial relations; that they have be-
come an important factor in commerce because of the in-
terstate character of their activities.., to provide for the
general welfare and the free flow of commerce.... that
it is therefore desirable in the interests of employees and
their beneficiaries, for the protection of the revenue of
the United States, and to provide for the free flow of
23. Title XVIII of the Social Security Act covers Hospital Insurance Benefits for the
Aged and Disabled (42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395i-5 (1994)), Supplementary Medical Insurance
Benefits for the Aged and Disabled (42 U.S.C. §§ 1395j-1395w-4 (1994)), and Medicare +
Choice (42 U.S.C. §§ 1395w-21-1395w-28 (1994)).
24. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994).
commerce, that minimum standards be provided assuring
the equitable character of such plans and their financial
soundness .....
It is hereby further declared to be the policy of this
Chapter to protect interstate commerce, the Federal tax-
ing power, and the interests of participants in private
pension plans and their beneficiaries by improving the
equitable character and the soundness of such plans by
requiring them to vest the accrued benefits of employees
with significant periods of service, to meet minimum
standards of funding, and by requiring plan termination
insurance. 25
The movement for federal regulation and uniformity in employee
benefits plans in 1978 focused primarily on pension benefits. Health
plans were not an issue, as managed care had yet to become an impor-
tant consideration. As numerous authors have noted,26 the effect ERISA
would have on health care law was unanticipated. Professor Farrell
stated, "abuses of health benefit plans and a need for national uniformity
were not apparent in 1974. ' '27 Quite the opposite, Congress expressly
stated in a "savings clause" that health insurance provided to ERISA-
protected employees should continue to be state regulated.28 Nonethe-
less, Congress made it abundantly clear from the definitions it set forth
that Congress intended ERISA to regulate health insurance plans. The
language states in pertinent part:
(1) The terms "employee welfare benefit plan" and "wel-
25. Id.
26. See generally Jana K. Strain & Eleanor D. Kinney, The Road Paved with Good In-
tentions: Problems and Potential for Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance Under ERISA,
31 Loy. U. Cmi. L.J. 29 (1999) (arguing that the first step in reforming U.S. health care is
reforming ERISA); Peter D. Jacobson & Scott D. Pomfret, Form, Function, and Managed
Care Torts: Achieving Fairness and Equity in ERISA Jurisprudence, 35 Hous. L. REV. 985
(1998) (suggesting a clarification of ERISA with a functional analysis); Deborah S. David-
son, Balancing the Interests of State Health Care Reform and Uniform Employee Benefit
Laws Under ERISA: A "Uniform Patient Protection Act," 53 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP.
L. 203 (1998) (discussing the absence of comprehensive health care reform and suggesting
means to achieve it); Karen A. Jorden, The Complete Pre-emption Dilemma: A Legal Proc-
ess Perspective, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 927 (1996) (exploring complete pre-emption as
providing more principled and purposive law); James E. Holloway, ERISA, Pre-emption and
Comprehensive Federal Health Care: A Call for "Cooperative Federalism" To Preserve the
States' Role in Formulating Health Care Policy, 16 CAMPBELL L. REV. 405 (1994) (taking
the position that health care is becoming a field of exclusively federal regulation).
27. See Farrell, supra note 13, at 257.
28. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b) (1994).
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fare plan" mean any plan, fund, or program which was
heretofore or is hereafter established or maintained by an
employer or by an employee organization, or by both, to
the extent that such plan, fund, or program was estab-
lished or is maintained for the purpose of providing for
its participants or their beneficiaries, through the pur-
chase of insurance or otherwise, (A) medical, surgical, or
hospital care or benefits, or benefits in the event of sick-
ness, accident, disability....
The major thrust of ERISA was to pre-empt state laws that conflicted
with the federal scheme. 30 Congress also limited employee rights.3 '
Specifically, an employee covered by an ERISA plan who has had ser-
vices denied is limited to a suit for the cost of the services denied, as-
suming that he or she has paid for the services.32 In the alternative, the
employee may seek an injunction to require that the company provide
the benefits.33 A negligence suit is barred because it "relates to" an em-
ployee benefit plan. Supreme Court jurisprudence in the area has had a
substantial effect, by essentially leaving the health care consumer in-
jured by the denial of health care services without a remedy.
The question of whether a federal law pre-empts a state statute was
presented to the Supreme Court in 1983 when it was called upon to de-
termine whether ERISA pre-empted the New York Human Rights
Law. 34 Ruling that the New York statute did indeed "relate to" an em-
ployee benefit plan, the Court concluded that: "a law 'relates to' an em-
ployee benefit plan, in the normal sense of the phrase, if it has a connec-
tion with or reference to such a plan." 35 The Court further noted that
"Congress used the words 'relate to' in § 514(a) in their broad sense." 36
Following the logic of the Court's decision in the 1987 case of Shaw
v. Delta Airlines, Inc., the Court decided two cases concerning ERISA
pre-emption. 37 The Court heard the argument for both cases, and on the
29. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1994).
30. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994) (providing that the statute supersedes a state law that
"relates to" an employee benefit plan).
31. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(1994).
32. Id.
33. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(l)(B) (1994).
34. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 88 (1983).
35. Id. at 96-97.
36. Id. at 98.
37. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58 (1987); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux,
481 U.S. 41 (1987).
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same day, Justice O'Connor delivered both opinions. In Pilot Life Insur-
ance Co. v. Dedeaux, an employee and beneficiary covered by a long-
term disability policy brought an action in state court for "Tortious
Breach of Contract," "Breach of Fiduciary Duties," and "Fraud in the
Inducement. '38  Noting the "expansive sweep of the pre-emption
clause," 39 Justice O'Connor stated that "[t]he common law causes of ac-
tion raised in Dedeaux's complaint, each based on alleged improper
processing of a claim for benefits under an employee benefit plan, un-
doubtedly meet the criteria for pre-emption under § 514(a)." 40 Referring
specifically to the provisions for civil enforcement in the federal courts,
she noted that:
In sum, the detailed provisions of § 502(a) set forth a
comprehensive civil enforcement scheme that represents
a careful balancing of the need for prompt and fair
claims settlement procedures against the public interest
in encouraging the formation of employee benefit plans.
The policy choices reflected in the inclusion of certain
remedies and the exclusion of others under the federal
scheme would be completely undermined if ERISA-plan
participants and beneficiaries were free to obtain reme-
dies under state law that Congress rejected in ERISA. 4'
In the companion case, Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Taylor, the
Court decided "whether these state common law claims are not only pre-
empted by ERISA, but also displaced by ERISA's civil enforcement
provision, § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B),... to the extent
that complaints filed in state courts purporting to plead such common
law causes of action are removable to federal court under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(b)."' 42 The plaintiff in this case brought an action in state court
to enforce an employment contract and to collect damages for "mental
anguish caused by breach of this contract, as well as immediate reim-
plementation of all benefits and insurance coverages ... ."43 The Court
had no difficulty concluding that the cause of action "related to" an ER-
ISA plan and was therefore pre-empted.44 Holding that the cause of ac-
38. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. at 44.
39. Id. at 47.
40. Id. at 48.
41. Id. at 54.
42. Taylor, 481 U.S. at 60.
43. Id. at61.
44. Id. at 62.
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tion was removable to federal court, 4 5 Justice O'Connor noted that
"pre-emption is ordinarily a federal defense to the plaintiffs suit." 46
The court also wrote: "Congress may so completely pre-empt a particu-
lar area that any civil complaint raising this select group of claims is
necessarily federal in character." 47 Drawing an analogy to § 301 of the
Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947,48 and quoting Senator Wil-
liams49 (who was an ERISA sponsor), Justice O'Connor concluded that
in enacting ERISA, Congress intended total pre-emption. 50
How then are these holdings to be applied when the issue involves ac-
tions sounding in tort and involving the failure to provide and/or pay for
health care benefits? For the most part, courts have held that such suits
are pre-empted by ERISA.5 '
A seminal case on the issue, and one that is often cited as one of the
"horror stories," is Corcoran v. United Healthcare, Inc.52 Mrs. Cor-
coran, a pregnant woman, was considered a high risk due to numerous
medical problems. An employee of South Central Bell Telephone, she
applied for temporary disability benefits but was denied coverage. 53 Her
treating physician wrote to the company's medical consultant, who con-
tinued to deny coverage.54 Unilaterally and without notice to Mrs. Cor-
coran or her doctor, the company physician sought a second opinion.
This opinion concluded, "the company would be at considerable risk de-
nying her doctor's recommendation." 55  Because Mrs. Corcoran had
previously experienced problems in pregnancy, her physician ordered
that she be hospitalized towards the end of the pregnancy so that "he
could monitor the fetus around the clock."'56 Blue Cross and Blue Shield
("Blue Cross") administered the company's self-funded health insurance
45. Id. at 67.
46. Id. at 63.
47. Id. at 63-64.
48. 29 U.S.C. § 141-185(a) (2001).
49. The senator stated: "It is intended that such actions will be regarded as arising un-
der the laws of the United States, in similar fashion to those brought under section 301 of the
Labor Management Relations Act." Taylor, 481 U.S. at 66 (quoting 120 CONG. REc. 29933
(1974)).
50. Id. at 67.
51. Several courts have refused to find pre-emption in negligence suits against HMOs
predicated upon vicarious liability. These cases are discussed infra pp. 344-49.
52. 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992).
53. Id. at 1326.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1323.
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plan.57 However, United HealthCare ("United") administered pre-
certification of hospital admissions.58 Pursuant to the plan's require-
ments, her treating physician sought approval for her admission.
59
United refused to pre-certify, finding that an inpatient stay was not
medically necessary. 60 Instead, they authorized home nursing for ten
hours a day.6 1 Although Mrs. Corcoran entered the hospital, she was
forced to return home after nine days.62 Thirteen days later, when the
nurse was not present, "the fetus went into distress and died."' 63 Mrs.
Corcoran and her husband brought a wrongful death action against both
Blue Cross and United.64 The defendants removed the matter to federal
court and moved for summary judgment, arguing that the claims "related
to" an ERISA plan and were therefore pre-empted.65 The district court
ruled in the defendants' favor.66 On appeal, the defendants asserted that
they were making benefit determinations rather than medical deci-
sions.67 Therefore, they argued that the claims should be pre-empted. 68
The Corcorans on the other hand, asserted that the defendants were mak-
ing medical decisions. 69 While neither agreeing with the Corcorans nor
the defendants, the court held that "United makes medical decisions -
indeed, United gives medical advice - but it does so in the context of
making a determination about the availability of benefits under the
plan."' 70 The court held that ERISA pre-empted the action, leaving the
Corcorans without a remedy. 71 Reflecting on the result of its decision,
the court noted:
The result ERISA compels us to reach means that the
Corcorans have no remedy, state or federal, for what
may have been a serious mistake. This is troubling for
several reasons. First, it eliminates an important check
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1321.
59. Id. at 1324.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 1324.
65. Id. at 1324-25.
66. Id. at 1325.
67. Id. at 1329.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1330.
70. Id. at 1331.
71. Id. at 1334.
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on the thousands of medical decisions routinely made in
the burgeoning utilization review system. With liability
rules generally inapplicable, there is theoretically less
deterrence of substandard medical decisionmaking.
Moreover, if the cost of compliance with a standard of
care (reflected either in the cost of prevention or the cost
of paying judgments) need not be factored into utiliza-
tion review companies' cost of doing business, bad
medical judgments will end up being cost-free to the
plans that rely on these companies to contain medical
costs. ERISA plans, in turn, will have one less incentive
to seek out the companies that can deliver both high
quality services and reasonable prices.72
Another equally distasteful result occurred when Pamela Danca sued
Private Health Care Systems and Phoenix Home Life Mutual Insurance
Company. 73 Ms. Danca had a long history of mental illness. 74 In Sep-
tember 1994, her physician recommended hospitalization at McLean
Hospital. 75 In choosing this hospital, he relied on the fact that she had a
prior successful treatment in the facility. The defendants76 refused to
pre-certify the admission, but did pre-certify admission to another facil-
ity.77 Ms. Danca asserted that she did not receive proper care at the fa-
cility chosen by the defendants and, as a result of her inadequate care,
"attempted suicide by self-immolation, causing severe bums and perma-
nent disfiguring injuries." 78 Ms. Danca sued in Massachusetts Superior
Court, alleging various causes of action sounding in negligence. 79 The
defendants removed the matter to federal court and moved to dismiss on
the grounds that the claims were preempted by ERISA. 80 The district
court granted the motion.81 Finding that although the "allegedly negli-
gent decision making... maybe characterized as medical in nature," the
court nonetheless held that "the conduct was indisputably part of the
process used to assess a participant's claim for a benefit payment under
72. Id. at 1338 (citation omitted).
73. Danca v. Private Health Care Sys. Inc., 185 F.3d 1, 1(st Cir. 1999).
74. Id. at 3.
75. Id. at 2.
76. Defendants are the claimant's insurance company and its utilization review agent.
Id. at 2.
77. Id. at 3.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 3.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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the plan." 82 As such, the court held the state law tort claims were "al-
ternative enforcement mechanisms under ERISA," and therefore were
preempted. 83 Conversely, the Third Circuit ruled in 1995 that malprac-
tice claims involving quality of benefits were not claims for the recovery
of benefits under the ostensible agency theory, nor were they claims to
enforce plan rights nor clarify rights to future benefits "as those phrases
are used in § 502(a)(1)(B) of ERISA."'84 Therefore, the Third Circuit
ruled that they were not preempted.85 Other courts have since followed
the Third Circuit's reasoning. 86 In 1999, the Third Circuit revisited this
issue.87 Discussing the Dukes ruling, the court stated that:
Perhaps the most significant contribution made by the
Dukes opinion was the distinction drawn between (1)
state-law claims directed to the quality of benefits pro-
vided, which are not completely preempted, and (2)
claims "that the plans erroneously withheld benefits due"
or that seek "to enforce [plaintiffs'] rights under their re-
spective plans or to clarify their rights to future bene-
fits," which are subject to complete pre-emption. To re-
iterate, we embraced a distinction between claims
pertaining to the quality of the medical benefits provided
to a plan participant and claims that the plan participant
was entitled to, but did not receive, a certain quantum of
benefits under his or her plan.
88
The court further held that when the complaint does not allege a "fail-
ure to provide or authorize benefits under the plan," 89 the cause of action
82. Id. at 5-6.
83. Id. at 6.
84. Dukes v. U.S. Health Care, Inc., 57 F.3d 350, 351 (3rd Cir. 1995). The ostensible
agency theory will find the HMO liable when a patient looks to the HMO rather than the in-
dividual physician for care, and the HMO's conduct leads the patient to reasonably believe
he or she is being treated by an employee of the HMO. Id. at 352 (quoting Boyd v. Albert
Einstein Med. Ctr., 547 A.2d 1229, 1234-35 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988)).
85. Dukes, 57 F.3d at 352.
86. See, e.g., Lancaster v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 958 F. Supp. 1137, 1145 (E.D.
Va. 1997); Coyne & Delany Co. v. Selman, 98 F.2d 1457, 1467 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding
that "Delany's malpractice claim is not preempted because it does not 'relate to' an em-
ployee benefit plan within the meaning of ERISA's preemption provision"); Custer v.
Sweeney, 89 F.3d 1156, 1167 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that "Congress intended ERISA to
preempt state law malpractice claims involving professional services to ERISA plans.").
87. In re U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 193 F.3d 151 (3rd Cir. 1999), U.S. Healthcare v. Bau-
man, cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1242 (2000).
88. Id. at 161-62 (citations omitted).
89. Id. at 162.
Managed Care Grievance ProceduresFall 2001
348 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges
should not be completely pre-empted. 90
For courts following the Dukes and Bauman reasoning, the question
revolves around quality versus quantity.91 If the complaint alleges state
law claims of negligence, the case is one involving the quality of care
and will not be pre-empted. 92 If, on the other hand, the complaint al-
leges a failure to provide benefits under the terms of an ERISA plan, the
claim will be pre-empted. 93 Although the United States Supreme Court
refused to review this decision,94 the Court recently noted that decisions
on eligibility under a plan and "treatment decisions" are often "inextri-
cably mixed." 95 Thus, distinguishing between claims based upon "qual-
ity of care" as opposed to "quantity of care" will often be exceedingly
difficult.
Regardless of whether the patient is in a jurisdiction that adheres to
the Dukes and Bauman rationale, a negligence or malpractice suit is still
an unsatisfactory solution. The very appellation of a suit in "negli-
gence" or "malpractice" infers that the patient has been harmed. Both
patients and their doctors need a solution that will prevent the harm from
occurring.
Although ERISA was intended to protect employees and their benefi-
ciaries, the net effect as applied to health insurance has left them largely
unprotected. A patient who is denied care and resides in a jurisdiction
that has adopted Dukes and Bauman will generally lose in a state court
negligence action due to ERISA's pre-emptive effect.96 A patient who
sues in state court to enforce the terms of the plan will likely find the
matter removed to federal court.97 Without the ability to sue the man-
aged care entity (clearly not a satisfactory solution), and in the absence
of a national policy on grievance procedures, patients are relegated to
state statutes. What then does federal law provide? Which states have
90. Id. The Fifth Circuit took the same position in Corporate Health Ins., Inc. v. Tex.
Dep't of Ins., 215 F.3d 526, 534-35 (5th Cir. 2000), ruling that the portion of the Texas stat-
ute which imposes liability upon a managed care organization for failure to exercise ordinary
care in decision making was not preempted by ERISA.
91. In re U.S. Healthcare, 193 F.3d at 161-62 (construing Dukes' important contribu-
tion to the quality versus quantity dichotomy).
92. Id. at 162.
93. Id.
94. In re U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 193 F.3d 151 (3rd Cir. 1999), cert. denied, Bauman v.
U.S. Healthcare, Inc. 530 U.S. 1242 (2000).
95. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 229 (2000).
96. See Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57 F.3d 350, 350 (3rd Cir. 1995); see also In re
U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 193 F.3d at 151.
97. See Dukes, 57 F.3d at 350; see also In re U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 193 F.3d at 151.
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mandatory grievance procedures? Which states have mandatory external
review? What do the state statutes require? We turn now to an examina-
tion of those statutes.
II. CURRENT FEDERAL LAW AND STATE STATUTORY
SOLUTIONS
A) Federal provisions
The federal Health Maintenance Act requires HMOs to provide
"meaningful procedures for hearing and resolving grievances between
the health maintenance organization ... and the members of the organi-
zation. '"98 This mandate is, unfortunately, meaningless. As one author
has noted:
The HMO Act applies only to plans which seek designa-
tion as federally qualified HMOs. Even for those plans,
there is no provision for individual enrollee appeals.
Complaints about a plan's general failure to meet the re-
quirements of the Act can be sent to HCFA's Office of
Managed Care. However, there is no remedy under the
HMO Act for wrongful denial of care to an individual
enrollee.99
On February 20, 1998, President Clinton signed a memorandum that
directed the Secretary of Labor to "propose regulations to strengthen the
internal appeals process for all Employee Retirement Income Security
Act... health plans to ensure that decisions regarding urgent care are
resolved within not more than 72 hours and generally resolved within 15
days for non-urgent care." 100 Pursuant to that directive, final regulations
were published on November 21, 2000.101 The regulations set standards
for "minimum procedural requirements" for ERISA plans with regard to
deciding claims. 10 2 In setting time frames for decision-making, the de-
partment concluded that short time frames for group health plans and
98. 42 U.S.C. § 300(e)(c)(5) (2001).
99. Gordon Bonnyman, Jr. & Michele M. Johnson, Unseen Peril: Inadequate Enrollee
Grievance Protections in Public Managed Care Programs, 65 TENN. L. REv. 359, 370-71
(1998).
100. 29 C.F.R. § 2560 (2000).
101. Id.
102. Id. These standards apply only to internal review by the carrier and do not deal
with the issue of external review. Id.
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disability plans were "crucial" to protect plan members. 10 3 Specific ref-
erence is made to pre-emption. The regulation states that "[n]othing in
this section shall be construed to supersede any provision of State law
that regulates insurance, except to the extent that such law prevents the
application of a requirement of this section." 1°4 The fact that a state's
law provides for a grievance procedure will not prevent application of
the regulation. 10 5 It is unclear whether a state procedure containing
longer time frames will be considered to "prevent the application of a
requirement" of the regulation.' 0 6 There are no provisions concerning
enforcement of these regulations. Thus, the patient is relegated to a suit
under Section 502(a) of ERISA. 107
B) State Solutions
Most states have statutes requiring managed care entities to maintain
some form of internal grievance review. Only five states lack such a
provision, 10 8 whereas several state statutes apply only to health mainte-
nance organizations, not other forms of managed care. 10 9 Only twenty-
three states require external review of those decisions. 110 Of those
twenty-three states, decisions of the external review organizations are
103. Id. Under the new regulations, all claims decisions must be made within a reason-
able period of time, taking into consideration the patient's condition. 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-
l(f)(1) (2000). However, an urgent care determination must be made within seventy-two
hours of the filing of the claim. 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(f)(2)(i). A claim involving services
yet to be provided must be determined within fifteen days of the receipt of the claim. 29
C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(f)(2)(iii)(A). Where services have already been provided the plan has
up to thirty days to make a decision. 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(f)(2)(iii)(B).
104. 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(k)(1).
105. 29 C.F.R.§ 2560.503-1(k)(2)(i).
106. See 29 C.F.R. § 2560-503-1(k).
107. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1994).
108. The states that lack this type of provision are Arkansas, Delaware, Massachusetts,
New Mexico and South Carolina. See infra "State Solutions Chart" at p. 351-52.
109. The states that apply this type of provision are Iowa, Louisiana, North Dakota,
Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Washington, and West Virginia. See infra "State Solutions
Chart" at p. 351-52.
110. See infra "State Solutions Chart" at p. 351-52. The National Committee for Qual-
ity Assurance, a private organization responsible for accreditation of health care carriers,
added a requirement in March 1999 for an external review process in order for a plan to
qualify for approval. Quality Assurance: NCQA Adds External Review Requirement to Man-
aged Care Accreditation Standards, 8 BNA's Health Law Rep. 443 (March 18, 1999). This
has, to some extent, been responsible for an increase in the number of plans offering an ex-
ternal appeals process. However, these external appeals processes remain purely private
rather than statutorily mandated.
binding in only thirteen states. I1 l The following chart indicates whether
a state has mandatory grievance procedures or mandatory external re-
view, and whether such review is binding on the parties. Following the
chart is a summary of the provisions of each state's statutes.
112
STATE SOLUTIONS
Cl' A4A1~.Jfl t~VTIV PDAC MANDI EYT1ERNAI, REV. BINDING
MAND E R B-- - -
AL
AZ
AR
CT
CO
DE
FL
GA
HI
ID
Il
IN
IA
LA
KS
KY
MA
MD
MI
MN
MS
MO
MT
NE
NV
NH
NJ (statute)
(adm. code)
NM
NY
NC
ND
OH
OR
OK
PA
RI
SC
yes
yes
no
yes
yes
no
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes (HMOs only)
yes (HMOs only)
yes
yes
no
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes (HMOs only)
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
no
yes
yes
yes (HMOs only)
yes
yes
yes
yes
yes
no
111. See infra "State Solutions Chart" at 351-52.
112. Virtually all of these statutes have time frames for filing appeals, providing docu-
mentation, and decision-making. In most instances these time frames will not be discussed.
113. The carrier's second-level review determination is binding on the carrier. How-
ever, since no external binding review is required, a decision adverse to the enrollee leaves
the enrollee without a remedy.
yes yes
yes yes
no no
yes yes
yes
no
no
yes yes
yes no
no
yes yes
yes yes
no
no
no
no
no no
yes no
no no
yes yes
no no
yes yes
yes (for all managed care entities) yes
no yesI 13
no no
yes no
yes no
yes no
no no
yes yes
no no
no no
yes no
no no
yes no
yes yes
yes no
no no
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SD yes no no
TN yes (HMOs only) yes yes
TX yes (HMOs only) yes (all MCO entities) no
UT yes (HMOs only) no no
VT yes (HMOs only) no no
VA yes yes yes
WA yes (HMOs only) no no
WV yes (HMOs and prepaid ltd. HSOs) 1 4 no no
WI yes no no
WY yes no no
Alaska devotes a title in the state's insurance law to "Regulation of
Managed Care Insurance Plans." 115 Decisions to deny payment for a
service because it is not medically necessary must be made by an agent
of the MCO, who is a state licensed health care provider. 116 In addition,
the statute mandates timely decisions and an internal appeals proce-
dure. 117 An MCO may condition external review upon completion of
the company's internal review process. The state maintains standards
for the qualification of external review agencies. 118 The judicial review
is de novo, and the statute delineates evidence that may be considered in
reaching a decision.1 19 A written decision must be rendered promptly,
stating the rationale for the decision and informing enrollees of their
right to appeal to the courts. 12 0 The decision is binding unless appealed
to the superior court. 12 1
Arizona requires health care insurers to provide, at a minimum, the
following four levels of review: 122 (1) an expedited medical review in
situations where delay may negatively impact the patient's condition; (2)
an informal reconsideration; 123 (3) a formal appeals process; and (4) an
114. HSO means "Health Service Organization."
115. ALASKA STAT. § 21.07 (Michie 2000).
116. ALASKA STAT. § 21.07.020(4)(B) (Michie 2000).
117. ALASKA STAT. § 21.07.020(4)(A). A decision to deny payment must be made
within seventy-two hours of the request for pre-approval of health care services. In emer-
gency situations, the decision must be made within twenty-four hours of the request. Id.
118. ALASKA STAT. § 21.07.060 (Michie 2000).
119. ALASKA STAT. § 21.07.050 (Michie 2000).
120. Id. A decision is required within twenty-one working days from the filing of the
request for review. In the event of an expedited appeal, the decision must be reached within
seventy-two hours. ALASKA STAT. § 21.07.050(d)(8).
121. ALASKA STAT. § 21.07.050(d)(8). The statute appears to allow either the MCO or
the patient to appeal the decision, and a request for appeal must be filed within six months of
the date of the decision. ALASKA STAT. § 21.07.050(0.
122. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-2533 (West Supp. 2000).
123. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-2535 (West Supp. 2000). However, this is not re-
quired where the carrier's utilization review process applies only to the review of claims for
services already provided. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-2535.
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independent external review process. 124 Informal reconsideration allows
a patient up to two years from the date of the initial denial to file an ap-
peal. 125 The utilization review agent may request that the state's insur-
ance director commence an independent external review. 126 If the deci-
sion is adverse to the patient, it must contain supporting documentation
including the clinical criteria used, information concerning the formal
appeals process, and external review. 127  However, if the service is
found to qualify for coverage, the insurer is bound by this decision.
128
An aggrieved party must file a timely request for a formal appeal if the
issue involves a service that has yet to be provided. 129 However, if the
service has already been provided, the time limit extends to two years
from the notice of denial. 130 The statute requires a review of an issue of
medical necessity to be performed by a physician licensed either in Ari-
zona or another state and qualified in the medical specialty relating to
the service at issue. 131 The statute sets time frames within which a deci-
sion must be rendered. 132 At this level as well, the reviewer may initiate
external independent review. 133 If the plan member does not initiate ex-
ternal independent review after a denial decision is issued, the utilization
review agent must advise the plan member of the right to do so. 134 As in
the reconsideration stage, if the decision is made that the service should
be covered, the carrier is bound by this decision. 135 The utilization re-
view agent must choose one or more independent reviewers who are li-
censed physicians, and have neither a direct financial interest, nor previ-
ous knowledge of the case. 136 A decision by the independent reviewer
is considered a final administrative decision and is subject to judicial re-
view. 137 Thus, both the carrier and the plan member may appeal the de-
cision.
124. ARLZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 20-2537 (West Supp. 2000).
125. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 20-2535(A).
126. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 20-2535(E).
127. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 20-2535(F).
128. ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 20-2535(G).
129. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 20-2536(A) (West Supp. 2000).
130. Id.
131. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 20-2536(D).
132. ARIz. Rev. STAT. ANN. § 20-2536(E).
133. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 20-2536(F).
134. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §20-2536(G).
135. ARz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 20-2536(H).
136. AIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 20-2538 (West Supp. 2000).
137. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 20-2537(H).
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However, the health care insurer must provide care that is determined
to be medically necessary, whether or not judicial review is re-
quested. 138Arkansas merely requires carriers to provide "meaningful re-
view on the issue of denial." 139 What constitutes "meaningful review"
is not defined.
In California, health plans must maintain a grievance procedure and
provide aggrieved enrollees with forms for filing a written grievance. 140
The statute has two versions, one effective until January 1, 2001 and one
effective beginning January 1, 2001.141 The major difference is the
availability of independent medical review enacted in the second ver-
sion. 142 The enrollee may submit the grievance for departmental deter-
mination1 43 after completing the internal grievance procedure, or within
thirty days after filing the grievance.144 The enrollee is also entitled to
request mediation. If this method is chosen, the enrollee retains the right
to submit the grievance to the department after mediation is complete. 145
Expenses of the mediation process are borne by the parties equally. 146
The first version of the statute does not mandate compliance with the
department's decision upon review. However, after January 1, 2001, the
department may order the plan to "promptly offer and provide" the de-
nied services. 147 In the alternative, it may order the plan to reimburse
the enrollee for the costs of the services for which he or she paid outside
the plan if the department determines that it was reasonable to do so. 148
The decision of the department is binding on the parties. 149
A department known as the "Independent Medical Review System" is
138. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-2537(C)(1).
139. ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-99-410 (Michie 1999).
140. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1368(a)(1)-(3) (West 2000).
141. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1368.
142. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 1368(b)(3)-(5), 1368.03-04.
143. The statute fails to identify the department of state government to which it refers.
However, earlier sections of the same part refer to the insurance commissioner. Thus, it is
reasonable to conclude that this section refers to the Department of Insurance. In discussing
these provisions, wherever a reference is made to "the department" one can therefore rea-
sonably infer that it is the Department of Insurance. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§
444.23 (West 2000), 1342.5 (West 2000), 1343 (West 2000), 1317.2(a) (West 2000), 1349
(West 2000), 1357.17 (West 2000), & 1342.3 (West 2000)).
144. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1368(b)(1).
145. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1368(b)(9).
146. Id.
147. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1368(b)(6)(B).
148. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1368(6).
149. Id.
created under the statute delineating external review (which became ef-
fective January 1, 2001).150 A distinction is made between a "disputed
health care service" (a service which is eligible for coverage pursuant to
the plan but which has been denied) and a "coverage decision" (which is
a decision to deny coverage on the basis that the service is "included or
excluded" under the terms of the plan). 151 Only grievances relating to
"disputed health care services" 152 are eligible for processing under the
Independent Medical Review System. 153 A determination as to the na-
ture of the grievance is left to the department and will ultimately deter-
mine whether this procedure or that delineated in section 1368 ap-
plies.154 Provisions have been made for: expedited review in cases of
"imminent threat to health"; 155 the method of analysis; 156 avoidance of
conflicts of interest by reviewers;157 prompt and timely effectuation of
the decision by the health care plan; 158 assessment of costs (to be borne
by the health care plan);159 and a report to the legislature concerning
implementation due by March 1, 2002.160
In Colorado, Medicaid MCOs must provide a process for expedited
review including two levels of review for denials of care. 16 1 All other
managed care organizations are covered by consumer protection stan-
dards enacted in 1997.162 All plans must maintain grievance procedures
that comply with administrative rules concerning prompt investigation
of health claims involving utilization review and grievance proce-
dures. 163 External review is provided by regulation. 164
Connecticut requires an internal grievance procedure, but does not
150. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.30(a) (West 2000).
151. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.30(b)-(c).
152. Id.
153. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.30(d)(1).
154. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.30(d)(2)-(3).
155. CAL. HEALTH& SAFETY CODE § 1374.31 (West 2000).
156. CAL. HEALTH& SAFETY CODE § 1374.33 (West 2000).
157. CAL. HEALTH& SAFETY CODE § 1374.32 (West 2000).
158. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.34 (West 2000).
159. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.35(b) (West 2000).
160. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.36(a) (West 2000).
161. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 26-4-117 (West 2000).
162. Id.
163. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-16-704(9)(g)(I) (West 2000). The word "division"
refers to the Division of Insurance of the Department of Regulatory Agencies. See infra note
161.
164. 3 COLO. CODE REGS. §§ 702-2, 702-4 (2000); 3 COLO. CODE REGS. §§ 4-2-17, 4-
2-21 (2001).
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specify standards for the review. 165 In the event of a denial pursuant to
the company's internal review process, an enrollee or the provider (with
the consent of the enrollee) may appeal the denial to the Commissioner
of Insurance. 166 A filing fee of twenty-five dollars (waived for an indi-
gent enrollee) is required. 167 Review is conducted on behalf of the
Commissioner by an independent review organization (often referred to
as an "IRO"). 168 The determination of the IRO must be accepted by the
Commissioner and is binding on the parties. 169 As an additional protec-
tion for consumers, in the 1999 session, the legislature established the
Office of Managed Care Ombudsman. 170 Among the duties imposed
upon the ombudsman is the duty to "[p]ursue administrative remedies on
behalf of and with the consent of any health insurance consumers."
171
Delaware requires a health care insurer to maintain an internal review
process; an aggrieved individual may submit a request for arbitration or
mediation to the state's insurance commissioner. 172 Parties to such arbi-
tration retain the right to petition for de novo review by the state's Supe-
rior Court. 17 3 If the result is adverse to the patient, the statute merely
requires a written decision that contains a summary of the facts; refers to
the language of the policy; provides a rationale for the denial; and identi-
fies the evidence relied upon to reach the decision. 17
4
Although Florida requires HMOs to provide both formal and informal
internal grievance procedures, the state does not require external re-
view.175 Florida recently passed legislation providing that the Agency
for Health Care Administration publish annual report cards for
HMOs. 17 6 Additionally, the new legislation regulates other non-HMO
health care providers, requiring that they charge reasonable fees and
165. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-478m (2001).
166. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-478n.
167. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-478n(b)(2).
168. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-478n(c). Standards for utilization review companies act-
ing in the state are contained in CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-226c (2001).
169. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-478n(d).
170. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-1041 (2001).
171. Id.
172. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 332 (2001).
173. Id. De novo review is subject to the rules of pre-emption established by ERISA,
citing to Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 101 (1989). See supra note
30.
174. Id.
175. FLA. STAT. ch. 641.22(9) (2001).
176. FLA. STAT. ch. 99-393 (2001).
costs to the insured. 17 7 Like Connecticut, Florida has an ombudsman for
managed care. 178
The Georgia legislature has made it clear that "it is a vital government
function to protect patients from managed care practices which have the
effect of denying or limiting appropriate care." 179 Moreover, it is the
avowed public policy of the state that providers of health care advocate
on behalf of their patients.180 In keeping with this statement of policy,
managed care plans must include provisions that allow the patient to
seek required emergency care without fear that the claim will be denied
retrospectively. 181 Managed care organizations must notify enrollees of
their rights and explain their grievance procedure (which is mandated by
statute). 182 Each MCO must have a grievance procedure providing for a
hearing by a panel of at least three individuals. 183 At least one panel
member must be a physician 84 (and cannot be the medical director of
the plan), and at least one panel member must be a provider trained and
licensed to provide the treatment or procedure in question.185 Although
no time limit is specified for the issuance of a decision, "prompt notice"
of the outcome is mandated. 186 If the determination is favorable, the
treatment or procedure must be authorized "without delay."' 187 If it is
unfavorable, notice to the enrollee must contain specific findings as to
why the care requested cannot be authorized. 188 The notice must also
state the policies relied upon to reach a decision, any recommendations
for alternative care, and information concerning a reconsideration de-
termination (if available). 189 An appeal to an IRO is available when an
unfavorable determination is issued pursuant to the plan's grievance
procedure, or where the MCO has not complied with the statutory re-
177. Id.
178. FLA. STAT. ch. 641.60 (2001) (providing for a statewide managed care ombuds-
man committee).
179. GA. CODE ANN. § 33-20A-2 (2000).
180. Id.
181. GA. CODE ANN. § 33-20A-9 (emphasis added).
182. GA. CODE ANN. § 33-20A-5.
183. GA. CODE ANN. § 33-20A-5(3)(B)(ii).
184. Id. The physician may be a plan member or may also be a shareholder of the plan.
See infra note 142.
185. GA. CODE ANN. § 33-20A-5(3)(B)(ii) (2000).
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
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quirements. 190 Special provisions exist for those suffering from terminal
conditions where the treatment prescribed is excluded as experimen-
tal. 19 1 In the event independent review is requested, a state agency as-
signs the matter to an IRO. 192 Costs of the IRO are the responsibility of
the managed care organization. 193 Although the IRO has a short time
frame for the issuance of a decision, this time limit may be extended or
shortened by agreement of the parties. 194 Expedited review is available
where delay would jeopardize the health of the enrollee. 195 A decision
favorable to the patient is binding on the MCO. 196 In what appears to be
a concession to the insurance industry, the statute provides that a deter-
mination favorable to the MCO creates a rebuttable presumption in any
subsequent litigation that the decision was appropriate. 197 Moreover,
lawsuits against MCOs are barred unless the affected party or his or her
designated representative exhausts all administrative remedies.
198
In 1998, Hawaii enacted a patients' bill of rights. 199 Managed care
plans operating in the state must establish and maintain a complaint
resolution procedure.200 There are, however, separate procedures for
claims involving mental health, drug or alcohol treatment.20 1 An enrol-
lee who has exhausted all the company's internal complaint procedures
may appeal a denial of care to a three-member panel appointed by the
Commissioner of Insurance. 20 2 The panel is comprised of a representa-
tive of the enrollee's health plan (who is not involved in the dispute), a
provider licensed and practicing medicine in Hawaii (also an individual
who is not involved in the dispute), and either the Commissioner or a
designee. 20 3 A majority vote of the panel is required for a decision. 2°4
There is no provision to make the panel's decision binding on the man-
190. GA. CODE ANN. § 33-20A-32 (2000).
191. Id.
192. GA. CODE ANN. § 33-20A-35 (2000).
193. Id.
194. GA. CODE ANN. § 33-20A-36 (2000). A decision must issue within fifteen days.
195. Id.
196. GA. CODE ANN. § 33-20A-37 (2000).
197. Id.
198. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-49 (2000).
199. HAW. REV. STAT. § 432E (2000).
200. HAW. REv. STAT. § 432E-5 (2000).
201. HAW. REV. STAT. § 334B (2000).
202. HAW. REV. STAT. § 432E-6 (2000).
203. Id.
204. Id.
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aged care entity. 20 5
Idaho requires MCOs to establish a grievance procedure and submit it
to the director of the Department of Insurance for approval.20 6 Records
must be maintained delineating the grounds for the grievances filed, and
the total number processed. 20 7 There are no provisions for external re-
view. 208
On August 18, 1999, Illinois enacted comprehensive managed care
reform. 20 9 Among the rights enunciated is the patient's right to "care
consistent with professional standards of practice to assure quality nurs-
ing and medical practices. -210 To assure that this is not just a hol-
low affirmation, the statute prohibits retaliation against physicians and
other providers who advocate on behalf of their patients, 211 mandates
external review of adverse determinations, 212 and establishes an "Office
of Consumer Health Insurance" to assist consumers in understanding
their plans and their rights.2 13 Health care plans must establish a griev-
ance procedure, notify enrollees of the process, and render a prompt de-
cision on any appeal.214 Appeals must be reviewed by "an appropriate
health care professional" (presumably a physician trained in the field of
medicine under consideration) and decisions must be provided to the en-
rollee, his or her primary care physician and the provider who prescribed
the service under review.2 15 If a determination adverse to the enrollee is
rendered, the enrollee is entitled to an external review. 216 The statute
requires that the health care plan provide a method for "joint selection of
an external independent reviewer by the enrollee, the enrollee's physi-
cian or other health care provider, and the health care plan .... " 217 The
state affords a very short time to render the decision. 218 That decision is
205. Id.
206. IDAHO CODE § 41-3918 (Michie 2000).
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 134/1 (West 2001).
210. 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 134/5(a)(1) (West 2001).
211. 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 134/35(a) (West 2001).
212. 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 134/45 (West 2001).
213. 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 134/90 (West 2001).
214. 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 134/45(c) (requiring a decision within fifteen days).
215. 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 134/45(b), (d).
216. 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 134/45(e).
217. 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 134/45(f)(3)(A).
218. 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 134/45(f)(4) (requiring a decision five days from the
filing).
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final and binding on the plan. 219 If the decision favors the enrollee, the
health care plan must pay for the service. 220 Costs of the independent
external review are borne by the plan.221 The impartiality of the peer
reviewer is assured by provisions requiring that the reviewer have no di-
rect financial interest in the matter and not be informed of the specific
identity of the enrollee. 222 He or she is immunized from liability
whether civil, criminal, or professional223 thus providing further assur-
ance of independence and impartiality. Administrative complaints are
handled under a separate process.224 The Department of Insurance must
maintain records of all complaints filed 225 and must classify the com-
plaints under categories contained in the statute.226 Utilization review
agents must be accredited and registered with the Department of Insur-
ance.227 In addition to these provisions, the Illinois Health Maintenance
Organization Act 228 requires an "independent second opinion"229 when
there is a dispute between a patient's primary care physician and the
HMO as to the medical necessity of a "covered service. '"230 If the inde-
pendent physician determines that the service is medically necessary, the
HMO must provide the service.
231
Indiana mandates an external grievance procedure to review adverse
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 134/45(0(5).
222. 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 134/45(f(8)(A), (B), (C).
223. 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 134/45(0(6).
224. 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 134/50 (West 2001).
225. 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 134/55 (West 2001).
226. 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 134/55(d)(1)-(10).
227. 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 134/85 (West 2001).
228. 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 125/4-10 (West 2001).
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. In reviewing the statute, the Seventh Circuit noted that under "Illinois law,
laws are automatically incorporated into all contracts of insurance in that state." It further
held that claims under the statute were properly recharacterized as a claim for benefits under
section 502(a)(1)(B) of ERISA, and removal from the state court to the federal court was
proper. The court further held that in the case under consideration, although a suit under the
Illinois statute was a suit to enforce rights under an ERISA plan, the statute did not conflict
with the provisions of ERISA. Holding that the act "simply establishes an additional internal
mechanism for making decisions about medical necessity," it allowed the plan participant to
recover reimbursement from the HMO. Moran v. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc., 230 F.3d 959,
971 (7th Cir. 2000). This decision conflicts with the Fifth Circuit's decision in Corcoran v.
United Healthcare, Inc., 956 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992). A petition for certiorari was granted
by the Supreme Court on June 29, 2001. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 331 U.S. 948
(2001).
utilization review decisions, adverse medical necessity decisions and de-
terminations that a proposed service is experimental.232 However, when
an individual is entitled to external review under Medicare these rules do
not apply.233 The format for the grievance procedure specified in the
statute must allow for an expedited appeal when delay would seriously
jeopardize the enrollee's health or life.234 The statute mandates rotation
of the independent review organizations selected in each appeal.
235
Conflicts of interest among the medical review professionals are prohib-
ited and enrollees may be required to pay a fee of up to twenty-five dol-
lars toward the cost of the review. 236 An enrollee has the right to submit
any relevant information. 237 If the matter is before an IRO when the
new evidence is submitted, the IRO must cease all action until the HMO
reconsiders the matter. 238 Accordingly, IROs must be certified by the
Department of Insurance239 and their decision is binding on the
HMO.
2 4 0
Both Iowa 24 1 and Louisiana 2 42 merely require HMOs (but not other
forms of managed care) to maintain a complaint system to resolve writ-
ten complaints. 243  These states do not provide for external review.
Kansas, while not explicitly mandating an internal grievance procedure,
does so by implication. 244 Like Iowa and Louisiana, Kentucky requires
only that a plan have a "satisfactory grievance procedure and the ability
to respond to enrollee's inquiries and complaints." 245 However, unlike
Iowa and Louisiana, this statute applies to all health plans in the state.
246
232. IND. CODE ANN. § 27-13-10.1-1 (Michie 2001).
233. IND. CODEANN. § 27-13-10.1-11.
234. IND. CODE ANN. § 27-13-10.1-2.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. IND. CODE ANN. § 27-13-10.1-6.
238. Id.
239. IND. CODE ANN. § 27-13-10.1-8.
240. IND. CODEANN. § 27-13-10.1-5.
241. IOWA CODE § 514B.14 (2000).
242. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:2022 (West 2000).
243. Although lacking a requirement for a mandatory complaint system for other types
of managed care entitites, Louisiana does provide mandatory time lines for a managed care
entity to render a decision on a request to authorize treatment or testing. LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 22:2021 (West 2000).
244. The statute delineating requirements for a certificate of authority provides that cer-
tain items, including a statement describing the internal grievance procedure, shall accom-
pany applications. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-3203(b)(5) (2000).
245. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 304.17A-300 (Michie 2000).
246. Id.
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Maine requires all carriers offering managed care plans to provide
grievance procedures that notify enrollees of a denial in a timely man-
ner.247 The notice must contain a rationale for the denial, information
about the right to file a grievance, the procedure for filing and time limit
within which to file.248 In the event that a medical opinion is "a material
issue in the dispute," the enrollee is entitled to a second opinion.
249
Once authorization for a procedure or treatment is given, a carrier may
not retroactively deny coverage. 25
0
Maryland requires an internal grievance procedure that includes an
expedited decision in cases of emergency. 25 1 A written decision is man-
dated, and in non-emergency cases, must be provided quickly.252 Sepa-
rate procedures exist for contesting decisions regarding addiction disor-
ders and mental impairment cases. 253 In the event of a retrospective
denial, the MCO may take more time to render its decision. 254 After ex-
hausting the carrier's internal procedure, an enrollee may file a com-
plaint with the Commissioner of Insurance. 255 Within the Office of the
Commissioner, a Health Advocacy Unit will assist the enrollee with the
filing of an internal grievance, but may not accompany or represent the
member in the proceeding. 256 A carrier may delegate the internal griev-
ance process to a private review organization, but if it does so, the deci-
sion of the reviewing agent is binding on the carrier.257 Independent re-
view by the Commissioner of Insurance is available upon request by the
enrollee or the health care provider.258 The burden of proof lies with the
carrier to establish that its determination was correct.259 However, the
statute fails to make the Commissioner's decision binding on the carrier.
Massachusetts does not appear to require a grievance procedure for
247. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 4303 (West 2001).
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 4304 (West 2001).
251. MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-1OA-02 (2001).
252. Id. (requiring a decision within thirty days of the filing of the grievance).
253. MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-1OB-06 (2001).
254. MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-1OA-02 (allowing the MCO up to forty-five days).
255. Exhaustion is not required where the enrollee or his designee files sufficient sup-
porting evidence to establish a "compelling" reason. MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-10A-
02(d)(1)(i).
256. MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-10A-02(f)(2)(v).
257. MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-1OA-02(1).
258. MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-1OA-03 (2001). The request must be filed within thirty
days of the receipt of the internal grievance process decision.
259. Id.
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adverse managed care decisions. 260  However, in 1999, the Massachu-
setts Legislature introduced more than twenty bills dealing with patient
protection issues. 26 1 One bill dealt directly with the issue of external
appeals of adverse determinations. 262  This bill would require each
health insurance plan to establish and maintain an internal appeals proc-
ess26 3 and an external appeals process. 264  It would also establish an
"Independent Appeal Board' 265 and a managed care ombudsman.
266
The 1999 session of the legislature closed without passing this bill.
267
Michigan requires HMOs to establish formal internal grievance pro-
cedures that include written notification of the basis for an adverse de-
termination and the procedures for filing a grievance. 268 An appeal of
this decision may be made to the Health Department.
269
Minnesota enacted statutes to deal separately with grievances requir-
ing a medical determination and those that do not.270 When the issue is
whether the care requested is experimental, investigative, or not gener-
ally acceptable care, a three-member panel reviews the denial and re-
ports to the Commissioner of Insurance. 271 In non-emergency cases, pa-
tients are required to exhaust internal grievance procedures. 272 A denial
260. An extensive search of the LEXIS and Westlaw databases utilizing keywords in-
cluding "managed care appeals process," "appeals from adverse determinations by managed
care," and "external appeals of adverse determinations by managed care" failed to reveal
statutes governing such procedures.
261. See, e.g., H.B. 1130, 1999 Leg., 181st Gen Court. (Mass. 1999); H.B. 3858, 1999
Leg., 181st Gen Court. (Mass. 1999); H.B. 2887, 1999 Leg., 181st Gen Court. (Mass. 1999);
H.B. 4468, 1999 Leg., 181st Gen Court. (Mass. 1999); H.B. 3658, 1999 Leg., 181st Gen
Court. (Mass. 1999).
262. S.B. 501, 1999 Leg., 181st Gen Court. (Mass. 1999).
263. S.B. 501 § 18B(l), 1999 Leg., 181st Gen Court. (Mass. 1999).
264. S.B. 501 § 18C(l)-(3), 1999 Leg., 181st Gen Court. (Mass. 1999).
265. S.B. 501 § 18D, 1999 Leg., 181st Gen Court. (Mass. 1999).
266. Id.
267. The last action was taken on June 28, 1999, when a new draft of the legislation
was substituted for the original version. See 1999 Bill Tracking MA S.B. 501, available at
LEXIS, Massachusetts Bill Tracking StateNet (report on the disposition of S.B. 501, 1999
Leg., 181 st Gen Court. (Mass. 1999), upon the conclusion of the 1999 session).
268. MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 500.2213 (West 2001).
269. Id. An extensive search of Westlaw and Lexis databases failed to reveal statutes
governing appeals to the Health Department, however, the statute does require the Commis-
sioner to establish a procedure for such appeals. Id.
270. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62Q.68-73 (West Supp. 2001) (providing the requirements
for Health Plan Companies complaint Resolutions); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62M.01-16 (West
Supp. 2001) (regarding the Minnesota Utilization Review Act of 1992).
271. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 72A.327(a), (c) (West Supp. 2001).
272. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 72A.327(d).
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of such care may be further appealed to a state District Court. 273 Ap-
peals concerning other denials of care are processed by a utilization re-
view organization, with an expedited review (over the telephone where
necessary) in cases where the patient's medical condition warrants an
immediate decision.274 Where an attending physician or other health
care professional makes the request, the review must be conducted by an
individual in the same specialty that normally manages the condition,
procedure, or treatment.275 Notice to the patient must contain informa-
tion concerning the right to external review and the procedure for com-
mencing such review.276 A request for external review requires pay-
ment of a $25 filing fee that may be waived if there is evidence of
financial hardship.277 The statute contains minimum criteria that must
be met by the external review agent (including expertise in health law,
dispute resolution, and lack of conflict of interest).278 The statute man-
dates that the plan provide a time line for the filing of information and
inform the enrollee of his or her right to representation. 279 The decision
is not binding on the enrollee who seeks judicial review, but is binding
on the health plan.280 The health care plan may only seek judicial review
"where the decision was arbitrary and capricious or involved an abuse of
discretion."281
Mississippi requires that all HMOs maintain a grievance procedure
approved by the Insurance Commissioner.282 However, there is no pro-
vision for external review. Whether these provisions apply to other
managed care entities is questionable as the Mississippi Code specifi-
cally defines managed care entities. 283 The definition includes HMOs
and other types of managed care entities, but the statute mandating
grievance procedures refers only to HMOs. 284
273. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 72A.327 (stating that if the matter is taken to the state court
a trial de novo is held).
274. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62M.06 (West Supp. 2001) (declaring that a decision must be
rendered within thirty days of the receipt of the notice of appeal).
275. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62M.06.3(f).
276. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62M.06.2(g).
277. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62M.73.3(a) (West Supp. 2001).
278. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 62Q.73.5(g).
279. MISS. CODE ANN. § 62Q.73.6 (providing that a decision must be rendered within
forty days of the receipt of the request for review).
280. MISS. CODE ANN. § 62Q.73.8 (West Supp. 2001).
281. Id.
282. MISS. CODE ANN. § 83-41-321 (West Supp. 1996).
283. MISS. CODE ANN. § 83-41-403 (West Supp. 1996).
284. Id.
Missouri statutes enumerate a three-tiered review of adverse determi-
nations. 285 All health insurers that offer a managed care plan must pro-
vide a first and second level review of adverse determinations. 286 Re-
ceipt of a request for review must be acknowledged in writing.287 An
impartial decision-maker must make a prompt decision. 288 If the deci-
sion affirms the denial of care, notice must be provided advising the en-
rollee of the right to a second level review. 289 The statute requires
"clear and specific" 290 notice to be sent to the individual who filed the
grievance. 291 Second level grievances are submitted to a panel that con-
sists of other enrollees and representatives of the carrier (who were not
involved in the facts and circumstances of the grievance). 292 When the
issue is one regarding a denial of medical care, members of the panel
must include a physician in the same specialty of medicine that is under
review.293 In addition to the statutory provisions, the director of the De-
partment of Insurance is given rulemaking authority. 294 Rules promul-
gated may be neither more nor less stringent than those governing such
procedures for Medicare enrollees. 295 The time frames for investigation,
determination, and notice of decision are those that apply to the first
level review (except where an expedited review is required). 296 The
panel's decision must provide notice of the right to file an appeal to the
director of the department of insurance, the address of the director, and
the toll-free telephone number. 297 In those circumstances where delay
would "seriously jeopardize the life or health of an enrollee or would
jeopardize the enrollee's ability to regain maximum function," an expe-
285. Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 376.1350-1389 (West Supp. 2001).
286. Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 376.1353, 376.1359, 376.1361, 376.1363 (West Supp. 2001)
(declaring that carriers that maintain utilization review procedures must have an approved
plan filed with the Director of Insurance, must use documented clinical review criteria and
must follow procedures set by statute for making determinations and notifying enrollees).
287. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 376.1382.2(1) (West 2000).
288. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 376.1382.2(2) (declaring that the decision must be made within
five days of completing the investigation).
289. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 376.1382.2(3).
290. Id.
291. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 376.1382.2(4) (declaring that notice must be sent within fifteen
working days after the completion of the investigation).
292. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 376.1385.1 (West 2000).
293. Id.
294. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 354.562 (West 2000).
295. Id.
296. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 376.1385.2 (West 2000).
297. Id.
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dited review is available. 298 The director of the Department of Insur-
ance must resolve the grievance "through any means not specifically
prohibited by law . -299 If the director is unable to resolve the griev-
ance, then it must be referred to an IRO. 30 0 A register of certified IROs
is maintained and assignment to an IRO is on a rotational basis. 30 1 The
decision of the IRO is considered a final agency decision and is binding
on both the carrier and the enrollee. 30 2 Judicial review is available for
those instances where the appellant argues that the action of the director
is arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, unlawful, unconstitutional, or is an
abuse of discretion.30 3
The Montana statute requires any HMO petitioning for a certificate of
authority to establish a complaint system30 4 that must be approved by
the Commissioner of Insurance. 30 5 An enrollee is entitled to notice of
the denial of a claim. Notice must contain information on the right to
file a complaint as well as the requisite procedures. 30 6 Adverse determi-
nations involving issues regarding provided or proposed care, whether
made by an HMO or any other managed care entity, is subject to inde-
pendent review.307 The carrier is responsible for the cost of peer review
and the determination is binding on the managed care entity. 30 8
Nebraska has adopted the "Health Carrier Grievance Procedure
Act." 30 9 The Act's stated purpose is "to provide standards for the estab-
lishment and maintenance of procedures by health carriers to assure that
covered persons have the opportunity for the appropriate resolution of
their grievances as defined in the act."'310 A two level grievance proce-
dure is established that binds the carrier.311 A reviewer with "appropriate
298. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 376.1389 (West 2000) (stating that a decision must be made
within seventy-two hours of the receipt of the request for review (oral or written) and written
confirmation of the decision must be given within three working days).
299. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 376.1387.1 (West 2000).
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-31-201(3)(d)(xi) (1999).
305. MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-31-303(1)(a) (1999).
306. MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-31-201(1)(b).
307. MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-37-102(1) (1999).
308. MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-37-102(3)-(4).
309. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 44-7301 to -7315 (1998).
310. NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-7302 (1998).
311. NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-7309(1)-(2)(a) (1998).
expertise" must handle first level review. 312 A written decision contain-
ing the medical rationale in clear terms is mandated; however, the statute
fails to provide a time frame for the issuance of the decision.313 In the
event of an adverse determination, the notice must provide information
concerning the right to a second-level review and the procedures appli-
cable. 3 14 The notice must also inform the enrollee of his or her right to
contact the office of the Director of Insurance and must contain the tele-
phone number and address of the director's office. 3 15 At the second-
level review, the enrollee has the right to appear before a grievance re-
view panel.316 The panel members are appointed by the carrier, must
have appropriate expertise, and must have no connection to the facts and
circumstances of the grievance (including all prior determinations).
317
The enrollee has the right to attend the meeting, present the case to the
panel, submit new evidence, question the carrier's representative, and be
represented by an individual of his or her choice.318 The written deci-
sion is binding on the carrier.319 Expedited review procedures are avail-
able where delay would seriously impair the health of the enrollee.
320
Violations of the statute are punishable by fines and suspension or revo-
cation of the carrier's certificate of authority.
321
Nevada requires HMOs and all managed care entities to establish a
system for resolving grievances and must notify enrollees of their rights
and the procedures involved in filing a grievance. 322 The managed care
entity must provide an employee to assist the enrollee in filing a com-
plaint and/or appealing the decision of the statutorily mandated review
board. 32 3 The review board is a part of the managed care entity's griev-
ance procedure. A majority of the members of the board must be enrol-
lees of the MCO.3 24 In the event that the complaint involves "an immi-
312. NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-7308(1) (1998).
313. NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-7308.
314. NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-7308(3)(e)-(f).
315. NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-7308(3)(g).
316. NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-7309(1) (1998).
317. Id.
318. NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-7309(3) (A meeting of the review panel must be held within
forty-five working days).
319. NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-7309(2)(a) (The decision must be issued within five work-
ing days of the meeting).
320. NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-7311(1) (1998).
321. NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-7312 to -7313 (1998).
322. NEB. REV. STAT. § 695C.265 (1987); NEB. REV. STAT. § 695G.200 (1999).
323. NEB. REV. STAT. § 695G.200 (3)(a) (1999).
324. NEB. REV. STAT. § 695G.210(1) (1999).
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nent and serious threat to the health of the insured, ' 325 an expedited re-
view and a written decision are required within seventy-two hours of the
filing of the complaint.326 No provision is made for binding external re-
view.
New Hampshire requires all carriers offering managed care plans to
provide written procedures for grievance resolution, file copies of the
procedures and all relevant materials with the Commissioner of Insur-
ance, maintain written records documenting grievances filed, and pro-
vide consumers with a full description of the procedures available.327 A
carrier's written denial of care must contain notice of the right to an in-
ternal grievance process.328 A two level review is available to the enrol-
lee. The first level review decision must be made by someone other than
the individual who rendered the initial denial.329 The written decision
must contain the titles and qualifying credentials of those participating in
the review, a statement of the nature of the grievance, a clear statement
of the contract basis or medical rationale for the decision, a discussion of
the documentation, and notice of the process for obtaining second level
review along with any time frame for review. 330 Standard review of ad-
verse determinations must be submitted to clinical peers "in the same or
similar specialty as would typically manage the case being reviewed. '33 1
A request for review from an adverse standard review determination is
treated as a second level grievance. 332 For the second level review, the
carrier appoints a review panel for each grievance. 333 A majority of the
panel must not have previous involvement in the grievance and the car-
rier must provide at least one clinical peer with appropriate expertise in
the field under review.334 A written decision is required.335 A copy of
the decision must be submitted to the insurance department as well as
the enrollee.336 It must contain a statement of the issues, facts, a ration-
325. NEB. REV. STAT. § 695G.210(3) (1999).
326. Id. (In non-emergency cases, a determination by the review board must be made
within thirty days from the filing of a complaint).
327. N.H. REV. STAT. § 420-J:5(I)-(ll) (1998).
328. N.H. REV. STAT. § 420-J:5(II)(c).
329. N.H. REV. STAT. § 420-J:5(III)(a).
330. N.H. REV. STAT.§ 420-J:5(III)(b) (The decision must be rendered within twenty
days of the receipt of a grievance).
331. N.H. REV. STAT. § 420-J:5(IV)(b).
332. N.H. REV. STAT. § 420-J:5(IV)(d).
333. N.H. REV. STAT. § 420-J:5(V)(a)(1).
334. N.H. REV. STAT. § 420-J:5(V)(a)(2).
335. N.H. REV. STAT. § 420-J:5(V)(a)(3).
336. Id.
ale for the decision, reference to the supporting documentation, and if
the decision is adverse to the enrollee, instructions on requesting an ex-
ternal appeal.337 An enrollee may request an appearance before the re-
view panel.338 Expedited procedures are mandated in cases where delay
would jeopardize the health of the enrollee.339 An external review con-
ducted by the insurance department is available for those dissatisfied
with the second level decision.340 However, the statute fails to specify
procedures, and does not make the external review decision binding on
the carrier. 3
4 1
In 1997, New Jersey enacted the "Health Care Quality Act." 342 This
statute must be read in conjunction with ancillary New Jersey Adminis-
trative Code provisions in order to understand the full measure of state
requirements for internal and external review of adverse determinations.
Although the statute provides for an "Independent Health Care Appeals
Program" in the Department of Health,343 no mention is made of the
mandatory internal review process. Those provisions are located in the
New Jersey Administrative Code.344 HMOs are required to establish
utilization review programs in order to monitor procedures, under-
utilization and/or over utilization, clinical review criteria, and evaluation
of member satisfaction with the complaint and appeals system.345 Deci-
sions to deny care, limit a hospital stay, or deny payment for a proce-
dure, must be made by a physician.346 Such decisions must be "directly
communicated by the physician to the provider."347 In the event of ur-
gent or emergency cases, the physician must be available to render a de-
cision "immediately." 348 Decisions must be made on a timely basis, and
retroactive denials of reimbursement are prohibited. 349 A member or his
337. Id. (stating that the decision must be made within five business days of the review
meeting.)
338. N.H. REV. STAT. § 420-J:5(V)(b)(1) (The meeting must be held within forty-five
days of the receipt of the request. Notice to the enrollee must be given at least fifteen days
prior to the date set.).
339. N.H. REV. STAT. § 420-J:5(VI).
340. N.H. REV. STAT. § 420-J:5(VII).
341. Id.
342. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2S-1 (West 1996).
343. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2S-11.
344. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, § 38-8.1 to -8 (2001).
345. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, § 38-8.1(a).
346. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, § 38-8.3(b).
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, § 38-8.3(c)-(d).
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or her agent may appeal an adverse determination. 350 A written expla-
nation of the appeals process is required.351 The first level appeal is
known as an "[i]nformal internal utilization management appeal process
(Stage 1). "352 At this point, the member or his or her designated
representative is given the opportunity to discuss the determination with
the HMO medical director and/or the physician who was responsible for
the initial denial.353 The statute sets a short time frame for decision-
making. 354 Stage 2 reviews allow the enrollee to appeal to a panel com-
prised of a physician and/or another health care provider not previously
involved in the matter.355 The HMO selects the panel. 356 In addition to
the physician panel member, consultants who are engaged in practice in
the specialty under consideration must be made available and may par-
ticipate in the panel if requested by the enrollee or his or her health care
provider.357 Should the panel issue a decision adverse to the -enrollee, it
must provide written notification to the enrollee of the right to an inde-
pendent external review and include appropriate forms. 358 The external
appeals process is delineated in the statute359 and in the administrative
code. 360 The statute allows any covered person to appeal a decision to
deny, reduce, or terminate benefits upon exhaustion of the carrier's ap-
peal process.3 61 The individual must pay a twenty-five dollar processing
fee, which may be waived upon a showing of hardship. 362 The appeal is
conducted by an independent utilization review organization ("IURO")
under contract to the commissioner. Findings of the IURO must be
stated in writing, and if the IURO determines that the carrier's denial
deprived a covered person of medically necessary covered services, it
350. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, § 38-8.3(e).
351. Id.
352. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, § 38-8.4(a).
353. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, § 38-8.5 (Decisions must be rendered within five busi-
ness days, however in cases of urgent or emergency care, a decision must be rendered no
later than seventy-two hours after the request for review is initiated.).
354. Id.
355. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, § 38-8.6(a).
356. Id.
357. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, § 38-8.6(b). Stage 2 reviews must be completed within
twenty days of receipt, except in the case of urgent or emergency care, which requires a de-
cision within seventy-two hours. Id.
358. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, § 38-8.6(0.
359. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2S-11 (West Supp. 2001).
360. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, § 38-8.7 (2001).
361. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2S-11 (a) (West Supp. 2001).
362. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2S-11(c) (West Supp. 2001) (A notice of appeal must be
filed within sixty days of the date of the decision.).
makes a recommendation to the carrier regarding what services the per-
son should receive.363 The carrier will then decide whether to accept or
reject the recommendation and notify the enrollee. 364 The IURO's de-
termination is not binding on the carrier.365 The statute makes it abun-
dantly clear that, should the enrollee seek the health services in question
outside the health plan, the enrollee is responsible for the cost.36 6 How-
ever, the carrier cannot routinely reject the IURO's recommendations
without consequences. In the event the commissioner sees a pattern of
noncompliance, the commissioner may impose sanctions and penal-
ties.367 The administrative code provisions are similar and require the
IURO to decide whether to accept the appeal. 368As with the statute, if
the IURO determines that the enrollee was deprived of medically neces-
sary care, it makes a recommendation to the carrier. 369 The HMO must
then submit a written report to the IURO and the Department of
Health. 370  The report must state whether the HMO will accept the
IURO's recommendation or reject them. 371 If the recommendation is
rejected, the HMO must provide the enrollee and the Department of
Health with a written explanation containing the basis for rejection. 372
While the administrative code provisions apply only to HMOs, it is not
entirely clear whether the statute applies only to HMOs or to all man-
aged care entities. The legislature has provided that the "Health Care
Quality Act" applies to HMOs3 73 and has also provided that no policy or
contract may be delivered, executed, or renewed after the effective date
of the "Health Care Quality Act," unless it complies with the Act.374
However, neither this statute nor the Act specifies that other managed
care entities must follow the "Independent Health Care Appeals Pro-
363. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2S-12(a).
364. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2S-12(c) (The external review must be completed and a de-
termination rendered within ninety days of the receipt of the application for appeal).
365. Id.
366. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2S-12(h).
367. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2S-12(d).
368. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, § 38-8.7(d)-(e) (2001).
369. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, § 38-8.7(i)-O).
370. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, § 38-8.7(k).
371. Id.
372. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, § 38-8.7(k)(1) (2002). (Once accepted, review must be
completed within thirty days from receipt of all documentation; extensions of time are avail-
able in certain circumstances.).
373. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2J-4.16 (West Supp. 2001).
374. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:2A-7.3 (2002).
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gram." 375 The specific language of the enabling statute uses the words
"review of final decisions by carriers .... 376 It remains to be seen as
to how the courts will construe these statutes.
In 1998, New Mexico enacted the "Patient Protection Act."377 Its
stated purpose is to "ensure that managed health care plans treat patients
fairly and arrange for the delivery of good quality services." 378 Yet,
notwithstanding its stated purpose, a mandatory and binding grievance
procedure for patients is not created. 379 However, a private right of ac-
tion is created giving enrollees rights as third party beneficiaries to en-
force the provisions of a managed care contract. 380 The enrollee may
sue to recover "actual damages" as long as they exceed one hundred dol-
lars.38 1 Given ERISA pre-emption, 382 it is questionable whether this
right of action will withstand scrutiny. Interestingly, the physi-
cian/provider is given specific rights. Health care plans must implement
a process that allows providers to question the quality and access to
health care services, the choice of providers, and the adequacy of the
plan's network of providers.
New York has enacted an extensive statutory scheme of grievance
procedures. Corollary procedures are contained in Article 49 of the In-
surance Law383 and Article 49 of the Public Health Law,384 both entitled
"Utilization Review and External Appeal." HMOs are directed to estab-
lish and maintain internal grievance procedures and provide enrollees
with written notice of the procedures. 385 Grievances may be filed either
orally or in writing.386 Enrollees may file a written appeal of an adverse
375. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2S-11 (2002).
376. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2S-1 (a).
377. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 59A-57-1 to 59A-57-11.B (Michie 1978).
378. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-57-2 (Michie 2001).
379. Even the statute delineating requirements for a certificate of authority for HMOs
fails in this regard. It merely provides that the HMO must supply a description of the inter-
nal grievance procedures used to resolve patient disputes. It does not require the plan to es-
tablish and maintain such procedures. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-46-3 (Michie 2001).
380. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 59A-57-9.A (Michie 2001).
381. N.M. STAT. ANN. §59A-57-9 (Michie 2001).
382. See supra Part 1.
383. N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 4900-4916 (McKinney 2000).
384. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 4900-4916 (McKinney Supp. 2001).
385. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4408-a (McKinney Supp. 2000) (stating that an ac-
knowledgement of the receipt must be provided within five business days). A thirty-day
time frame for resolution is mandated. Id. However, in cases where delay would cause sig-
nificant risk to the enrollee's health, a decision must be provided within forty-eight hours
after all information is received. Id.
386. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4408-a(3)(a)-(b) (McKinney 2001).
initial determination. 387  "Qualified personnel," including licensed
health care professionals, must review issues surrounding medical mat-
ters. 388 Accommodations are required to make the process accessible
for non-English speaking people.389 Other managed care entities are di-
rected to establish grievance procedures in the same manner and for-
mat.390 Utilization review ("UR") agents acting in New York must reg-
ister and report biennially to both the superintendent of the Department
of Insurance391 and the Commissioner of Health.392 There must be a
medical director who is a licensed physician.393 Written policies and
procedures based upon clinical review criteria are mandated. 394 All no-
tices of adverse determination must include the clinical basis for the de-
cision and instructions on how to file a request for standard and expe-
dited appeal as well as external appeal.395 Appropriate UR personnel
must be "reasonably accessible by toll-free telephone." 396 Emergency
services may not be subject to a prior authorization requirement and may
not be retroactively denied.397 Expedited appeals must be decided
within two business days of the receipt of all pertinent information. 398
Enrollees have a right to an external appeal of final adverse determina-
tions by their health plan.399 A filing fee of up to fifty dollars may be
charged by the health care plan (not required for recipients of public
medical assistance). In the event the decision is favorable to the enrol-
lee, the fee must be refunded. 4°° In the event of an adverse determina-
387. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4408-a(8) (McKinney 2001) (declaring that the case
must be filed within sixty days and that the time frame for resolution is identical to the initial
appeal).
388. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4408-a(10) (McKinney 2001).
389. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4408-a(2)(c).
390. N.Y. INS. LAW § 4802 (McKinney 2000).
391. N.Y. INS. LAW § 4901(a) (McKinney 2000).
392. N.Y. INS. LAW § 4901; N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4901(1) (McKinney Supp.
2001).
393. N.Y. INS. LAW § 4902 (McKinney 2000); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4902(l)(a)
(McKinney Supp. 2001).
394. N.Y. INS. LAW § 4902(a)(2); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4902(1)(b).
395. N.Y. INS. LAW § 4902(a)(5); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4902(1)(e).
396. N.Y. INS. LAW § 4902(a)(6); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4902(1)(f).
397. N.Y. INS. LAW § 4902(a)(8); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4902(1)(h).
398. N.Y. INS. LAW § 4904(b) (McKinney 2000); NY. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4904(2)(b)
(McKinney Supp. 2001).
399. N.Y. INS. LAW § 4910(c) (McKinney 2000); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4910(1)-
(2) (McKinney Supp. 2001).
400. N.Y. INS. LAW § 4910(c); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4910(3).
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tion, the enrollee may request an external appeal.401 The final determi-
nation is binding on both the plan and the enrollee and is admissible in
court proceedings.40 2 Specifically exempted from coverage are "self-
insured employee welfare benefit" plans as defined by ERISA.4 °3
North Carolina employs a two-tiered approach to the problem.4° 4 The
statute requires every insurer to maintain a grievance procedure.40 5 In
the event that the insurer does not provide for an informal process, a
two-stage process is required.40 6 A "First-Level" grievance may be de-
termined without an appearance by the enrollee.407 The carrier must ad-
vise the enrollee of the name and telephone number of a coordinator se-
lected to handle the matter. The enrollee has the right to submit written
information. 40 8 A written decision must contain the name and profes-
sional qualifications of the reviewer, the medical rationale for the deci-
sion, a citation to the evidence supporting the decision, and a statement
concerning the right to request "Second-Level" review. 40 9 "Second-
Level" review includes the right to attend and present the case to the
grievance panel. This includes the right to submit evidence and question
the review panel, as well as the right to representation.4 10 The review
panel is comprised of individuals who were not involved in prior deter-
minations, have appropriate expertise, and must include one clinical
peer.4 1 1As in "First-Level" review, the decision must include the profes-
sional qualifications of the panel, a statement of facts, and the medical
rationale for the panel's recommendation with a citation to the support-
401. N.Y. INS. LAW § 4914(b) (McKinney 2000); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4914(2)
(McKinney Supp. 2001) (declaring that a request must be filed within forty-five days of the
receipt of the adverse determination and a decision must be rendered within thirty days of
the request for review).
402. N.Y. INS. LAW § 4914(b)(4)(b)(iv)-(v); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4914 (2)(d)(A)
(iv)-(v).
403. N.Y. INS. LAW § 4908 (McKinney 2000); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4908
(McKinney Supp. 2001).
404. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-50-61 (1999).
405. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-50-62(b) (1999).
406. Id.
407. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-50-62(e)(1).
408. Id.
409. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-50-62(e)(2) (stating that notice containing the name of the
coordinator handling the matter must be given to the enrollee within three days of the filing
of the first-level grievance and the decision must be rendered within thirty days of the receipt
of the grievance).
410. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-50-62 (f)(1)(b).
411. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-50-62 (0(2).
ing documentation. 4 12 The insurer may disagree with the panel's rec-
ommendation.4 13 In that event, the decision must state the rationale for
the insurer's decision and contain a statement that it is the final decision
of the carrier. 4 14 Expedited review is available if medically justified,4 15
however, no provision is made for external review.
North Dakota requires only that HMOs establish and maintain a
grievance procedure that is approved by the Department of Insurance
Commissioner.4 16 Although there are statutory minimum requirements
for utilization review agents, including the provision for an expedited
appeals process in emergency or life-threatening situations, there is
nothing in the statute to indicate that use of a utilization review agent is
required or that decisions made by a UR agent are binding.
4 17
In Ohio, the term "grievance procedure" is not used in its statutory
scheme. Rather, all companies offering health insurance must have writ-
ten procedures to evaluate whether a requested service is covered by the
policy.4 18 They must also maintain written procedures for utilization re-
view, providing notice of its decisions to enrollees and providers.4 19 In
comparison to other states' statutes, unusually short time frames for no-
tice are required.420 When an adverse determination is made, the carrier
must notify the provider by telephone within three business days. 42 1
Written notification must be sent to both the provider and the enrollee
within a day after the telephone notice.422 Reviews relating to present
care require a decision within one business day after all information is
provided. 423 On the other hand, retrospective reviews carry a thirty-day
time frame for determination.424 The notice must provide rationale for
the decision and information on seeking reconsideration. 425 In the event
412. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-50-62(g)-(h) (stating that the review meeting must be held
within forty-five days of the request for review and notice of the meeting must be given at
least fifteen days in advance).
413. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-50-62(h)(6) (1991).
414. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-50-62(h)(5), (7).
415. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-50-62(i).
416. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 6.1-18.1-10 (1995).
417. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 26.1-26.4-04 (Supp. 1999).
418. Omno REV. CODE ANN. § 1751.81 (B) (Anderson Supp. 2000).
419. Id.
420. OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 1751.81(C)-(F).
421. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1751.81(C)(2).
422. Id.
423. Or-io REV. CODE ANN. § 1751.81(D).
424. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1751.81(E).
425. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1751.81(G).
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the time frames are not adhered to, the enrollee or his or her designee
has a right to an internal review. 426 Reconsideration must take place
within three business days after the carrier's receipt of the request, but it
is not a prerequisite to internal or external review.427 Internal review re-
quests must be acknowledged and decided within seven days of receipt
in cases requiring expedited review. For other matters, the carrier has up
to sixty days to reach a decision.428 External review is afforded to the
enrollee in cases where the cost of the services in question exceeds $500
and the carrier has determined that the services are covered but not
medically necessary. 429 Exceptions include instances where the superin-
tendent of insurance determines that the service is not a covered service,
the enrollee fails to exhaust the carrier's internal review process, or the
enrollee has previously had external review on the same issue and no
new evidence has been submitted.430 Expedited review is available
where immediate medical treatment is required to prevent "serious im-
pairment to bodily functions" and "serious dysfunction of any bodily or-
gan or part."'43 1 The superintendent of insurance is responsible for se-
lecting an independent review organization, but if the cost of the review
is the responsibility of the carrier. 432 Expedited review matters must be
decided within seven days, whereas standard review allows for thirty
days.433 Separate provisions exist for enrollees with terminal condi-
tions.434 An IRO decision is admissible into evidence in civil proceed-
ings that relate to the coverage decision subject to review.435 There is
no indication that the decision is binding on the carrier.
Oregon requires health benefit plans to maintain a grievance proce-
dure for resolving disputes that includes a two-tiered review. There is
no provision for external review. 436
The "Oklahoma Managed Care External Review Act" 437 ("Act") be-
came effective February 1, 2000. Every managed care organization sub-
426. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1751.81(F)(2).
427. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1751.82 (A), (C) (Anderson Supp. 2000).
428. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1751.83 (Anderson Supp. 2000).
429. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1751.84(A) (Anderson Supp. 2000).
430. Oiio REv. CODE ANN. § 1751.84(B).
431. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1751.84(C)(3).
432. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1751.84(D)(1), (5).
433. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1751.84(D)(9)(a).
434. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1751.85(A)(1) (Anderson Supp. 2000).
435. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1751.88 (Anderson Supp. 2000).
436. OR. REV. STAT. § 743.804 (2001).
437. OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, §§ 2528.1-.10 (2001).
ject to the Act must establish internal review procedures. 438 The state
board of health and the insurance commissioner are directed to establish
rules for these internal reviews. 439 Once an enrollee has exhausted all
internal appeals available under the plan of coverage, an adverse deter-
mination relating to medical necessity, medically appropriate or medi-
cally effective treatment involving a fee in excess of $1000.00 is subject
to external review.440 A request for review must be accompanied by a
filing fee of $50.00, with the balance of the costs to be paid by the health
care plan.441 If the enrollee prevails, the $50.00 fee must be re-
funded.442 The health benefit plan may reconsider its determination. If
a favorable decision is rendered, the external review terminates.
443
Once a request for external review is received by the health benefit plan,
it is their responsibility to select an IRO from a list certified by the state
department of health. However, the enrollee may object. If the enrollee
objects, the Department of Health may select another IRO.4 4 4 If the IRO
determines that the individual is insured, has notified the plan of their
decision to appeal and their request for an external review, and that the
service requested is a covered service, the IRO will proceed to a full re-
view. 445 The decision must be predicated upon the contract of coverage
and a consideration of the medical reports, the medical and scientific
evidence, and any other documentation submitted.446 Although no ex-
plicit statement is made that the IRO's determination is binding, a deci-
sion by the IRO that the health plan appropriately denied a claim for re-
imbursement in whole or in part creates a rebuttable presumption in any
subsequent legal action in favor of the carrier.447
Managed care plans in Pennsylvania must provide a complaint and
grievance process specified by statute.448 The complaint process is a
two-tiered review. At stage one, a committee of "one or more employ-
438. OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 2528.4(A) (2001).
439. OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 2528.4(B).
440. OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 2528.3(3) (2001).
441. OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 2528.5(A)(1)(a) (2001). The request for review must be
filed within thirty days of the receipt of a written denial from the health care plan. OKLA.
STAT. tit. 63, § 2528.6 (2001).
442. OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 2528.5(A)(1)(b).
443. Id.
444. OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 2528.6(B)(4)(2001).
445. OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 2528.6(D).
446. OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 2528.8(B) (2001). A decision on the merits must be ren-
dered within thirty days after the appeal is accepted for review. Id.
447. OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 2528.5.
448. 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 991.2111 (West Supp. 2001).
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ees of the managed care plan" conducts an investigation of the com-
plaint.449 At stage two, a review must be conducted by at least three
people who did not participate in the initial determination. Although the
carrier's employees may be members of the panel, at least one third of
the panel must be independent of the carrier. The notification to the en-
rollee must contain a rationale for the decision and information concern-
ing appeal to the insurance department. 450 An adverse second tier deci-
sion may be appealed to the Department of Insurance. The enrollee has
the right to be represented. 451 The grievance procedure mirrors the
complaint procedure.452
The statutes fail to delineate the reason for these duplicative proce-
dures. Additionally, the statutes do not indicate which procedure is ap-
propriate in a particular case. External review is only available for the
appeal of an adverse grievance process determination and not for an ad-
verse complaint determination. 453 A utilization review entity assigned
randomly from a state maintained list conducts the review.45 4 A physi-
cian or psychologist licensed in the same specialty that normally man-
ages treatment for the disputed service is responsible for the decision-
making.455 The standard of review is "medical necessity" under the
terms of the plan.456 An adverse decision may be appealed to "a court
of competent jurisdiction." However, there is a rebuttable presumption
in favor of the IRO decision.457 In the event of a decision that a service
is medically necessary, the carrier must authorize the service or pay the
claim.458 Costs are the responsibility of the losing party if the health
care provider filed the request for external review. Alternatively, costs
449. 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 991.2141(a) (West Supp. 2001). The investigation
must be completed within thirty days of its receipt.
450. 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 991.2141(b)(5). A decision must be rendered within
forty-five days of receipt of the request for review.
451. 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 991.2142(b) (West Supp. 2001).
452. See generally 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 991.2161(b) (West Supp. 2001).
453. 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 991.2162(a) (West Supp. 2001). The request for re-
view must be filed within fifteen days of the receipt of the adverse determination. 40 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 991.2142(c)(1).
454. 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 991.2162(b)(1).
455. 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 991.2162(c)(4)(i).
456. Id. 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 991.2162(c)(5). A written decision is required
within sixty days. Id.
457. 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 991.2162(c)(4)(i), (c)(5). A written decision is re-
quired within sixty days. As with similar provisions in other states, such legal action is most
likely pre-empted by ERISA. See supra Part I.
458. 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 991.2162(c)(4)(i), (c)(5), (c)(6).
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are the responsibility of the carrier if the enrollee filed the grievance.
459
Rhode Island has an extensive structure for regulating utilization re-
view. Termed the "Utilization Review Act," ("the URA") it requires
carriers to provide a dispute resolution process consistent with the URA,
registration of the utilization review agents, provision a two-tiered inter-
nal review and external appeal, and provision for penalties in the event
of a violation.460 Notices involving a decision not to certify a health
care service must include the rationale for the decision and instructions
on the procedures to initiate an appeal. The decision must be signed by
"a licensed practitioner with the same licensure status as the ordering
practitioner."461 In the event the initial appeal decision affirms the ad-
verse determination, a licensed practitioner in the same field as typically
manages the medical condition or treatment subject to review, must
conduct the next level review. 462 The statute prohibits a reviewer who
has previously been involved in the matter from engaging in subsequent
reviews.463 External appeals are conducted by "neutral physicians, den-
tist [sic], or other practitioners in the same or similar general specialty as
typically manages the health care service" in question.464 Payment for
the services of the "neutral physician" is borne equally by the two par-
ties to the appeal. However, if the utilization review decision is over-
turned, the utilization review agent must reimburse the appellant this
cost.46 5 Although the decision is not binding, anyone who is aggrieved
and has exhausted all administrative remedies may seek judicial review
of the decision. 46
6
South Carolina has no requirement for mandatory grievance proce-
dures. However, policyholders must be afforded an opportunity "to par-
ticipate in matters of policy and operation," and the HMOs must have a
plan to assure that quality health care is provided.
467
459. 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 991.2162(c)(4)(i), (c)(5), (c)(6), (c)(7).
460. R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 23-17.12-1 to -17 (2000).
461. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17.12-9 (2001). The statute provides a minimum of sixty
days within which to file a request to appeal an adverse determination. A decision on the
appeal must be rendered no later than fifteen days after receiving the required documenta-
tion. Id.
462. Id.
463. Id.
464. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17.12-10(b)(2) (2001).
465. Id.
466. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-17.12-7. Again, such judicial review is most likely pre-
empted by ERISA. Id.; see also supra Part I.
467. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 38-33-60, 38-33-40(A)(5) (Law. Co-op. 2001).
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South Dakota has codified its standards for managed care plans, dedi-
cating a chapter in the title covering insurance. 468 All managed care
plans are required to provide for grievance procedures approved by the
director of the insurance department, in consultation with the secretary
of the department of health.469 The director of the Department of Insur-
ance, consulting with the secretary of the Department of Health, is em-
powered to promulgate rules relating to time frames for the filing and
disposition of grievances.470 In the event the grievance involves medi-
cal issues of someone in the same field of practice as that of the provider
who requested review, the service must make the determination. 471 Re-
sponsibility for monitoring utilization review activities falls upon the
carrier. If utilization review activities are contracted out to a utilization
review entity, the carrier must monitor the activities of the utilization re-
view entity.472 Standards for utilization review must be in writing, and
documented clinical criteria must be used in evaluating cases. 473 In
cases involving a request for certification of an admission, procedure, or
service, an initial decision must be made within two working days of the
receipt of all pertinent information. 474 Written notice of an adverse de-
termination must contain the "principal reason" for the denial, instruc-
tions for filing an appeal, a grievance, or initiating reconsideration, and
instructions on requesting a written statement of the clinical rationale.
Interestingly, the carrier is not required to provide the clinical rationale
unless a request utilizing proper procedures is made.475 External review
is not mandated by statute.
In Tennessee, HMOs (but not other managed care entities) must
maintain a complaint system for resolving grievances, with decisions be-
ing subject to independent review.476 A grievance is defined as a writ-
ten complaint concerning availability or delivery of health care services,
468. See generally S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-17C-71 (Michie 2001).
469. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-18-65 (Michie 2001).
470. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-18-70 (Michie 2000) (repealed 2000).
471. Id.
472. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-17C-35 (Michie 2001).
473. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-17C-37 (Michie 2001).
474. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 58-17C-49, 17C-60 (Michie 2001). The statute provides
a minimum of sixty days within which to file a request to appeal an adverse determination.
A decision on the appeal must be rendered no later than fifteen days after receiving the re-
quired documentation. Id. However, retrospective reviews allow a thirty-day time frame for
the issuance of a decision. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-17C-51 (Michie 2001).
475. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-17C-52 (Michie 2001).
476. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 56-32-203, -210, -227 (West Supp. 2001).
claims for payment of such services, and issues arising out of the con-
tract.477 The company's grievance procedure must be filed with the
Commissioner of Insurance, and records concerning grievances filed
must be reported to the Commissioner on an annual basis. 478 Upon sub-
mission of a grievance, a "grievance review committee" within the
HMO reviews the complaint. The HMO must provide the enrollee with
the name, address, and telephone number of the review committee coor-
dinator,479 and a written decision is required in clear terms, containing
the medical rationale for the decision. 480 The enrollee has a right to re-
quest reconsideration by the Commissioner of Insurance. 481 The Com-
missioner, or their designee, must issue a written decision, but no time-
frame is provided.482 The statute precludes the decision of the
commissioner from being admitted into evidence in any judicial pro-
ceeding. 483 If the enrollee has complied with all the internal procedures
provided by the plan, as well as these statutory provisions, the enrollee
may request independent review of a determination that involves medi-
cal issues and a monetary amount of at least $500.00.484 The plan must
notify the enrollee in writing of the opportunity to have an independent
review, and a request for independent review must be filed in writing.
485
The enrollee, with the filing of the request, must pay a $50.00 filing
fee.4 86 The decision is binding on both the plan and the enrollee.487 The
statute provides minimum requirements for independent review entities,
including provisions concerning conflicts of interest, and requirements
for reviewers who are physician's expert in the treatment of the medical
477. TENN. CODE. ANN. § 56-32-210 (West Supp. 2000).
478. TENN. CODE. ANN. § 56-32-210(e)(5). Review must take place within ten work-
ing days.
479. TENN. CODE. ANN. § 56-32-210(c)(5).
480. TENN. CODE. ANN. § 56-32-210(c)(7)(B). It must be issued within five working
days from the review.
481. TENN. CODE. ANN. § 56-32-210(e)(1). A written request must be made within
thirty days of the receipt of the review committee's decision.
482. Id.
483. Id.
484. TENN. CODE. ANN. § 56-32-227(a)(4) (West Supp. 2000).
485. TENN. CODE. ANN. § 56-32-227(b)(1) (West 2001). It must be requested within
sixty days of the receipt of notification of the decision. Id.
486. TENN. CODE. ANN. § 56-32-227(b)(2). The IRO has thirty days within which to
submit its expert's determination, however, in cases of life-threatening conditions, the de-
termination must be made within five days of receipt of all pertinent information. TENN.
CODE. ANN. § 56-32-227(b)(5) (West 2001).
487. TENN. CODE. ANN. § 56-32-227(a)(2) (West 2001).
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condition under review.488
The Texas statute is unusual in that it creates a duty imposed upon all
health insurance organizations to "exercise ordinary care when making
health care treatment decisions, and concomitantly provides a cause of
action in negligence for damages caused by the failure to exercise ordi-
nary care."489 However, a suit for damages may not be filed unless the
enrollee has exhausted all appeals and agrees to submit the claim to
statutory independent review procedures. 490 Although it appears that
only HMOs are required to implement and maintain a complaint proce-
dure,491 the provisions for health care utilization review cover all com-
panies who write health insurance policies.492 Enrollees dissatisfied
with the decision of a health insurance company may submit the issue
for independent review. Review agents must use written, medically ac-
ceptable criteria.493 The decision, if adverse, must include the primary
reason for the determination, the clinical basis, a description of the
screening criteria used, and a description of the procedure for the com-
plaint and appeal process. 494 Special provisions are made for patients
hospitalized at the time of request for review495 and for immediate re-
view by an IRO in the case of a life-threatening condition.496 All
utilization review agents must provide a written description of the proce-
dures for appeal of an adverse determination. 497 A physician must
488. TENN. CODE. ANN. § 56-32-227(b) (West Supp. 2000).
489. Tx. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 88.002(a) (Vernon 2001). As previously
noted, this statute was examined by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Corporate
Health Ins., Inc. v. Tex. Dep't of Ins., 215 F.3d 526 (5th Cir. 2000); see also supra note 90
and accompanying text. The court ruled that those portions of the statute that provided for
liability on the part of the health care plan and for independent review were not preempted
under ERISA. Corporate Health Ins., Inc., 215 F.3d at 535. In holding the liability provision
not preempted, the court stated, "[w] e see nothing to take the liability provisions from the
regulatory reach of the states exercising their traditional police powers in regulating the qual-
ity of health care." Id.
490. TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 88.003(a).
491. TEx. INS. CODE ANN. § 21.58A (Vernon Supp. 2001).
492. Id.
493. TEx. INS. CODE ANN. § 21.58A § 4(i). Notification to both the enrollee and the
provider must be "mailed or otherwise transmitted" (thus allowing for electronic forms of
transmission) within two working days of the filing of a request and receipt of all pertinent
information by the review agent. This is an unusually short period of time compared to the
provisions of other states. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 21.58A § 5(b).
494. TEx. INS. CODE ANN. § 21.58A § 5(c).
495. TEx. INS. CODE ANN. § 21.58A § 5(d)(1).
496. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 21.58A § 5(c)(4)(c).
497. TEx. INS. CODE ANN. §21.58A § 6(a). If an appeal is filed, the UR agent must ac-
knowledge receipt of the request and provide the enrollee with a list of all documents that
conduct the review, and in the event of a denial and a request made by
the enrollee's health care provider, a specialist in the field that typically
manages the condition must review the denial.498 The utilization review
agent must also make provision to expedite appeals in cases of hospital-
ized patients and those whose conditions require emergency care.
4 99
Written notification of the determination must be made "as soon as prac-
tical. '' 5°° Appeal of an adverse determination to an independent review
organization is available upon request. 501 The Commissioner of Insur-
ance is granted the authority to adopt rules and regulations in order to
adequately implement the statute.50 2 Specifically excluded from cover-
age are matters involving "terms or benefits of employee welfare benefit
plans as defined in Section 3(1) of the Employee Retirement Income Se-
curity Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. Section 1002(1)). ",503 There is no provi-
sion making the IRO determination binding on the parties.
50 4
Utah requires HMOs and "limited health plans" to maintain a process
for resolving grievances. 50 5 Utah has established an "Office of Con-
sumer Health Assistance" responsible for assisting consumers in issues
such as contractual rights, available remedies, and initiating grievance
procedures. 50 6 Similarly, Vermont created the "Office of Health Care
Ombudsman" with similar responsibilities, 50 7 requiring HMOs to estab-
lish and maintain a grievance procedure that is approved by the Com-
missioner of Insurance.
50 8
must be submitted. TEx. INS. CODE ANN. § 21.58A § 6(b)(2).
498. TEx. INS. CODE ANN. § 21.58A § 6(a)(3). This review must be completed within
fifteen working days of the request. Id.
499. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 21.58A § 6(a)(4).
500. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 21.58A § 6(a)(6). The decision must be made no later
than "the 30th calendar day after the utilization review agent receives the appeal." TEX. INS.
CODE ANN. § 20A. 12(h) (Vernon 2001).
501. TEx. INS. CODE ANN. § 21.58A § 6(a). Although the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit ruled the liability provisions of this statute were not preempted, the court held
that the independent review provisions were preempted. It was the opinion of the court that
the independent review provisions were identical to the "relief offered under § 1 132(a)(1)(B)
of ERISA." Corporate Health Ins., Inc., 215 F.3d at 539; see also supra note 90 and accom-
panying text.
502. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 21.58A § 13 (Vernon & West Supp. 2001).
503. TEx. INS. CODE ANN. § 21.58A § 14(e) (Vernon & West Supp. 2001). Given this
exemption, the range of health care decisions subject to the statute is severely limited. See
Id.
504. See id.
505. UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-8-205(2) (Supp. 2001).
506. UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-2-216.
507. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4089j(a) (Supp. 2001).
508. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 5102a (Supp. 2001).
Managed Care Grievance ProceduresFall 2001
384 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 21-2
Although the Virginia statute governing insurance contracts does not
explicitly require managed care entities to maintain grievance proce-
dures, it does so by implication. 50 9 However, another section of the in-
surance law mandates the establishment and maintenance of a complaint
process.5 10 In 1999, the Virginia legislature enacted provisions for in-
dependent external review of adverse health care determinations. An
enrollee or a treating health care provider in receipt of an adverse deter-
mination for a service costing in excess of five hundred dollars may ap-
peal to the Bureau of Insurance. 511 A non-refundable $50.00 filing fee
is required, which may be waived where payment would cause undue
financial hardship. 512 The Bureau of Insurance is empowered to con-
tract with impartial health entities to perform the required reviews. 513
The impartial entity may affirm, modify, or reverse the adverse determi-
nation.514 It must submit its written recommendation to the Commis-
sioner of Insurance who then issues a written ruling. The Commissioner
must adhere to the recommendation unless there is reason to believe that
the impartial health entity exceeded its authority or acted in an arbitrary
and capricious manner.5 15 The Commissioner's decision is binding on
both the enrollee and the health insurance carrier.5 16
The state of Washington requires HMOs to provide a meaningful
grievance procedure,517 which is defined as "a procedure for investiga-
tion of consumer grievances in a timely manner aimed at mutual agree-
ment for settlement according to procedures approved by the commis-
sioner, and which may include arbitration procedures. '518 Neither a
statutory format for the procedure, nor a requirement for external review
509. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-305 (Michie 2000). A statute that deals with the contents
of insurance policies notes that "[hlealth maintenance organizations shall add the following:
We recommend that you familiarize yourself with our grievance procedure, and make use of
it before taking any other action." VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-305(B).
510. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5901 (Michie Supp. 2000).
511. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5902(a) (Michie 2000). The request must be filed within
thirty days of receipt of the decision.
512. Id. The appellant has ten days from the date of acceptance of the appeal within
which to supply copies of pertinent medical records to the Bureau of Insurance. VA. CODE
ANN. § 38.2-5901.
513. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5901(a).
514. Id. It must do so within thirty working days of the acceptance of the appeal by the
Bureau of Insurance. Id.
515. Id.
516. Id.
517. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 48.46.100, 48.46.030 (West 2001).
518. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 48.46.020 (West 2001).
exists.
West Virginia requires HMOs and prepaid limited health service or-
ganizations to maintain and establish a grievance procedure. It must be
approved by the Commissioner of Insurance and contain both formal
and informal steps.519 The HMO must have a grievance coordinator and
a toll free telephone number must be maintained.520 The grievance pro-
cedure must provide that the enrollee has a right to appeal an adverse
decision to the Commissioner of Insurance and written notice of this
right must be provided upon completion of the grievance procedure.
521
The enrollee must also be offered the opportunity to meet with the
HMO.5 22 Physician involvement in the review of medical issues is re-
quired.523
Wisconsin requires all managed care plans to have an internal griev-
ance procedure approved by the Commissioner of Insurance that allows
enrollees to file written grievances. 524 Grievances must be investigated
by a panel consisting of at least one enrollee, assuming an enrollee is
available, and one person who has authority to take corrective action.
525
No provision exists for external review of adverse determinations.
Wyoming mandates the maintenance of a complaint procedure and
the keeping of records concerning the total number of complaints and
underlying causes. 526 There are no statutory requirements concerning
the complaint procedures, nor are there requirements for external re-
view.
The federal provisions contain no enforcement mechanism. The vari-
ous state statutes are cumbersome and difficult for the layperson to un-
derstand. The federal circuits are in conflict as to whether state laws
519. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-25A-12 (Michie 2000). These statutes are virtually iden-
tical. Thus, when referring to an HMO in this section, this term is meant to include the pre-
paid limited health service organizations. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-25D-14(a) (Michie
2000).
520. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-25D-14(b)(4) (Michie 2000). The HMO has up to sixty
days to render a decision on a written grievance. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-25D-14(b)(6). An
additional thirty days is available in the event there is a need to collect information from out-
side the service area. Id.
521. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-25D-14(a) (Michie 2000). Although this provision ex-
ists, this author was unable to find any statutory provision or administrative rule governing
appeals to the commissioner of insurance. Id.
522. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-25D-14(b)(9) (Michie 2000).
523. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-25D-14(b)(12) (Michie 2000).
524. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 609.15 (West 2001).
525. Id.
526. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 26-34-103, 34-112 (Michie 2001).
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mandating external review are pre-empted by ERISA. Until this is re-
solved by the Supreme Court, 527 disparate treatment of patients' claims
from state to state is likely to continue. Moreover, while it is apparent
that state legislatures have given considerable time and effort to creating
solutions to the problem, the greater majority of health care consumers
are still left without a remedy when their MCO denies a request for ser-
vices. The question of whether the federal government can step in to
provide a grievance procedure for both ERISA and non-ERISA proce-
dure that preempts state legislation can only be answered by reviewing
the history of federalism and discussing federalism in its current format.
III. THE NEW FEDERALISM
From the earliest discussions about a "Union" at the Constitutional
Convention, and through the present, scholars, lawyers, and politicians
have debated about the roles of the federal government and state gov-
ernment.528 That federalism is an evolving theory of politics and law
cannot be questioned. Woodrow Wilson put it well when he stated:
The question of the relation of the states to the federal
government is the cardinal question of our constitutional
system ... Indeed, it cannot be settled by ... one gen-
eration, because it is a question of growth, and every
new successive stage of our political and economic de-
velopment gives it a new aspect, makes it a new ques-
tion. 529
During the latter part of the twentieth century, we have seen Presi-
dents Franklin D. Roosevelt, John F. Kennedy, Lyndon B. Johnson, and
William J. Clinton expand the role of federal government to legislate in
the area of social policy. In contrast, Presidents Nixon and Reagan were
proponents of New Federalism. How do we define New Federalism,
and how is it applied in the area of health care?
527. See supra note 231 and accompanying text (referring to the Supreme Court's re-
view of Moran v. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc., 230 F.3d 959 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. granted,
533 U.S. 948 (2001)).
528. For an excellent analysis of the historical roots of federalism, Harry N. Scheiber,
Redesigning the Architecture of Federalism-An American Tradition: Modem Devolution
Policies in Perspective, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 227 (Mar. 1996).
529. Id. (citing ARTHUR S. LINK, WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA, 19 10-
1917 (1954)).
A. The Evolution of Federalism and New Federalism Defined in its
Current Format
Most scholars look to the Federalist Papers for clues as to how the
founders intended federalism to work. One overlooked source is the
cover letter from George Washington to the President of the Congress
transmitting the Constitution. 530 Dated September 17, 1787, Mr. Wash-
ington wrote:
We have now the honor to submit to the consideration of
the United States in Congress assembled, that Constitu-
tion which has appeared to us the most advisable.
The friends of our country have long seen and desired,
that the power of making war, peace, and treaties, that of
levying money and regulating commerce, and the corre-
spondent executive and judicial authorities should be
fully and effectually vested in the general government of
the Union: But the impropriety of delegating such exten-
sive trust to one body of men is evident - Hence results
the necessity of a different organization.
It is obviously impracticable in the federal government
of these states, to secure all rights of independent sover-
eignty to each, and yet provide for the interest and safety
of all: Individuals entering into society, must give up a
share of liberty to preserve the rest. The magnitude of
the sacrifice must depend as well on situation and cir-
cumstance, as on the object to be obtained. It is at all
times difficult to draw with precision the line between
those rights which must be surrendered, and those which
may be reserved; and on the present occasion this diffi-
culty was increased by a difference among the several
states as to their situation, extent, habits, and particular
interests.
In all our deliberations on this subject we kept steadily in
our view, that which appears to us the greatest interest of
every true American, the consolidation of our Union, in
which is involved our prosperity, felicity, safety, perhaps
our national existence. This important consideration, se-
riously and deeply impressed on our minds, led each
state in the Convention to be less rigid on points of infe-
530. Daniel A. Farber, The Constitution's Forgotten Cover Letter: an Essay on the
New Federalism and the Original Understanding, 94 MICH. L. REv. 615, 649 (1995).
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rior magnitude, than might have been otherwise ex-
pected; and thus the Constitution, which we now present,
is the result of a spirit of amity, and of that mutual defer-
ence and concession which the peculiarity of our politi-
cal situation rendered indispensable.5
31
Looking at this language, there can be no doubt that the founders in-
tended certain matters of importance to be within the sole province of
the federal government, while other matters would rest with the states.
It is also apparent that the founders intended this to be an evolving doc-
trine.532 How then has federalism evolved? Prior to 1861, the concept
represented a "dual federalism." 533 States remained dominant in "a host
of areas vital to everyday life . ... ,,34 The reconstruction era was a pe-
riod of controversy over the powers of the states versus the power of the
federal government. 535 The end result in the area of social welfare was a
period of low wages, little protection for workers, and little expansion of
public services.536 Beginning in the 1880's, Woodrow Wilson became
an advocate for a strong central government. 537 His philosophy shaped
the federalism debate through the 1930's.538 Others disagreed, arguing
that "any increase in the centralized power... is injurious to certain as-
pects of traditional American democracy .... 539 The period known as
the "Progressive Era" saw a move towards a strong central government
and an expansion of federal administrative law.540 Although the 1920's
saw further expansion of the power of the central government, Chief
Justice Taft managed to reign in the expansion, noting that the attempt
by Congress to "use... a tax measure to get around a constitutional
prohibition would 'break down all constitutional limitation of the pow-
ers of Congress and completely wipe out the sovereignty of the
states." 5
4 1
531. Id.
532. Id. Note the words "the magnitude of the sacrifice must depend as well on situa-
tion and circumstance, as on the object to be obtained." Id.
533. Scheiber, supra note 528, at 234 (referring to Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of
Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1 (1950)).
534. Id. at 236.
535. See id. at 237.
536. Id. at 238.
537. Id. at 243.
538. Id. at 243-45.
539. Id. at 247 (citing the words of Herbert Croly).
540. Id. at 250-51.
541. Id. at 251 (citing Taft's decision in Baily v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20, 38
(1922)).
21-2
During the New Deal era, President Roosevelt and Congress, in a re-
action to the problems of the 1920's, systematically expanded the role of
the Federal Government.542 The Supreme Court engaged in a "funda-
mental restructuring of our constitutional law.. ." and "eventually found
constitutional grounds for broad discretionary authority in the Execu-
tive .. . ,543
President Eisenhower sought to redefine the role of the states, form-
ing a permanent advisory commission on intergovernmental relations,
and attempted to use the "Governors' Conference" to further advance his
project for "sorting out" the role of the states.544 Interestingly, this
stands in stark contrast to the legislation enacted during his administra-
tion which greatly expanded the federal government's role in social se-
curity, education, the federal highway system, and his "vigorous en-
forcement of federal courts' civil rights orders .... "545
The next great change in federalism came with the Presidency of
Lyndon Baines Johnson. He coined the term "Creative Federalism,"
stating that the solution for the social problems of the era "does not rest
on a massive program in Washington, nor can it rely solely on the
strained resources of local authority. They require us to create new con-
cepts of cooperation, a creative federalism, between the National Capital
and the leaders of local communities." 546 Social programs expanded
during this period, as did the federal regulatory process.
547
It was President Nixon who coined the term "New Federalism" as the
concept exists today, stating: "It is time for a New Federalism in which
power, funds, and responsibility will flow from Washington to the states
and to the people." 548 Although Nixon was the proponent of this "New
Federalism," it was President Reagan who refined and expanded it. In
his inaugural address he opined that:
It is time to check and reverse the growth of government
which shows signs of having grown beyond the consent
of the governed.
542. See generally MORTON KELLER ET AL., THE NEW DEAL - WHAT WAS IT? (1961);
FRANCES PERKINS, THE ROOSEVELT I KNEW (1946); DANIEL J. BOORSTEIN, THE AMERICANS:
THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIENCE (1973).
543. Scheiber, supra note 528, at 260.
544. Id. at 267 n.136.
545. Id. at 267-68.
546. Id. at 271.
547. Id. at 270.
548. Id. at 288.
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It is my intention to curb the size and influence of the
Federal establishment and to demand recognition of the
distinction between the powers granted to the Federal
Government and those reserved to the States or to the
people.54
9
It has been said that "New Federalism" has three basic principles.
"The first tenet is that the states retain crucial aspects of sovereignty."550
"The second tenet derives from the recognition that, under the Suprem-
acy Clause, federal power prevails where federal and state power over-
lap" and the third "holds that the states are not merely a structural fea-
ture of our governmental system but an important affirmative good in
need of protection." 55 1 President Reagan hoped that less action on the
part of the federal government would ultimately result in a total reduc-
tion of governmental action because the states would "be less proactive
than federal government." 552 In its present incarnation, we have wit-
nessed an expansion of the use of federal standards while allowing the
states the freedom to apply those standards. 553 This it seems is a return
to the "dual federalism" concept. With the election of George W. Bush
as President, we will in all likelihood see a return to Reagan-style feder-
alism.
B. New Federalism and its Application to the Health Law Arena
As we have observed, Congress has made it abundantly clear that
providing health insurance benefits is a national interest.554 One author
has suggested that pre-emption of this area by Congress has severely re-
stricted the ability of the states to enact health care reform. 555 Yet, the
same author cites any number of state initiatives in health care legisla-
tion.5 56 Although ERISA has limited to some extent the areas in which
549. Robert F. Rich & William D. White, Federalism and Health Care Policy, 1998 U.
ILL. L. REV. 861, 862 n.3 (1998).
550. Farber, supra note 530, at 625.
551. Id. at 626.
552. Rich & White, supra note 549, at 867-69.
553. See, e.g., The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 29
U.S.C. § 1181 (1996); Newborn's and Mothers, Health Protection Act of 1996, 29 U.S.C. §
1185 (1996); Mental Health Parity Act of 1996, 29 U.S.C. § 1185a (1996).
554. See discussion supra Part I.
555. James E. Holloway, ERISA, Preemption and Comprehensive Federal Health
Care: A Call For "Cooperative Federalism" To Preserve the States' Role In Formulating
Health Care Policy, 16 CAMPBELL L. REV. 405, 439 (1994).
556. Id. at 415-16.
states may legislate, there is no dearth of state action in the field of
health care.
We have reached a point in the evolution of federalism where the fed-
eral government must continue to take a strong role in setting policy for
health care and other areas of social welfare. Devolution of regulation
to the states in the welfare arena, by granting funds directly to the states
without specific direction as to their application, has resulted in the use
of those federal funds to pay for programs that have traditionally been
the responsibility of the states.557 This, it seems, is a sign that states
lack an ability to use federal funds responsibly. From this, one can rea-
sonably conclude that if Congress simply mandated minimum require-
ments for grievance procedures without federal administration, the pro-
gram would fail.558  Attempts by the states to legislate by creating
statutory grievance procedures in managed care have failed to produce
effective protections for the average citizen in the delivery of health
care.559 It is this lack of effective relief that establishes that the time has
come to return to the "Creative Federalism" proposed by President John-
son and his administration. A case-by-case approach is needed. Certain
areas of legislation are best left to the states. On the other hand, where
experience demonstrates that attempts by the states to protect national
interests have failed, Congress needs to retain the power to act.56° In
this context, we must next examine the existing proposals for a solution
to the problem of grievance resolution in managed care.
IV. EXISTING PROPOSALS AND PENDING LEGISLATION
In 1994, one author suggested that the Federal HMO Act561 be
amended to provide for a federal grievance procedure modeled on the
557. Raymond Hernandez, Federal Welfare Overhaul Allows Albany to Shift Money
Elsewhere, N.Y. TIMES, April 23, 2000, at Al.
558. The regulations issued by the Department of Labor, setting minimum procedural
requirements for ERISA plans are as yet untested. See supra note 102 and accompanying
text.
559. See discussion supra Part IH.
560. President Bush has indicated that he is in favor of independent review of claims.
See Robert Pear, Bush Set to Back State Laws to Extend H.M.O. Patients' Rights, N.Y.
TIMEs, Jan. 14, 2001, at A20. See also The President's Budget; Transcript of President
Bush's Message & Congress on His Budget Proposal, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2001, at A12. If
the Supreme Court rules in Moran that external review is preempted by ERISA, President
Bush and the nation will have to look at other alternatives. See discussion supra note 231
and accompanying text.
561. See Green, supra note 10.
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Medicare appeals process. 562 This author discusses at length the statu-
tory basis for Medicare appeals, but falls short of outlining what a fed-
eral grievance procedure should contain. 563 Another author has sug-
gested enacting a "Uniform Patient Protection Act" which would require
disclosure of such material as physician qualifications, plan coverage,
benefits, satisfaction statistics, and loss ratios.564 It would prohibit gag
clauses that prevent physicians from open discourse with patients, and
provide procedures for appeals. 565 Again, no specific recommendations
as to the format for appeals were made. In 1997, Representative Stark
proposed the Managed Care Plan Accountability Act of 1997.566 In the
103rd Congress, Representative Berman introduced the "Health Insur-
ance Claims Fairness Act." 567 The bill would have amended ERISA to
create an "Early Resolution Program," but did not create a binding
grievance procedure for health care service denials. 568
The 105th Congress spent considerable time dealing with the issue
but failed to reach a solution. In his opening statement in a hearing con-
ducted by the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources, Sena-
tor Jeffords noted:
First, the denial for care comes before the treatment. If
the denial was because the service was not a covered
benefit, the patient finds out too late. If the denial was
because the service was covered, but considered not
medically necessary, the patient may suffer if the treat-
ment really was medically necessary.
Second, long delays on the part of the health plan in
granting authorization can endanger the patient's life or
health.
Finally, patients currently have little understanding of
how or even if these health plan decisions can be ap-
562. See Susan J. Stayn, Securing Access to Care in Health Maintenance Organiza-
tions: Toward a Uniform Model of Grievance and Appeal Procedures, 94 COLUM. L. REV.
1674, 1711 (1994).
563. Id. at 1709-11.
564. Deborah S. Davidson, Balancing The Interests of State Health Care Reform and
Uniform Employee Benefit Laws Under ERISA: A Uniform Patient Protection Act, 53 WASH.
U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 203, 237-41 (1998).
565. Id. at 236.
566. H.R. 1749, 105th Cong. (1997).
567. H.R. 1881, 103rdCong. (1993).
568. Id.
pealed.56
9
During that hearing, Olena Berg, Assistant Secretary of the Pension
and Welfare Benefits Administration of the U.S. Department of Labor,
opined:
As our system is currently constituted there is no disince
ntive to applying harsh and arbitrary guidelines
for the initial denial of care. To litigate a claim's denial
requires significant resources, and some percentage of
claimants can be counted on to give up without pursuing
their claim. The current system lacks incentives to as-
sure that the initial claims determination is fair, since the
wrongly denied claimant who is injured can never seek
compensation for injury while his case is pending, and
the discouraged participant with a meritorious claim pre-
sents pure savings to the managed care entity. A system
which delays justice until an internal appeal or even a
threat of litigation saves the managed care entity money.
Thus, under our current system, there is a strong finan-
cial incentive to delay providing medical treatment be-
cause.., the only remedy that plan will have to provide
is the benefit that was denied.57°
At the same hearing, Margaret A. Hamburg, Assistant Secretary for
Planning and Evaluation of the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, emphasized that federal legislation was required to adequately
protect consumers. 57 1 The insurance industry and representatives of the
states' departments of insurance, on the other hand, opined that state
regulation was adequate and appropriate. 572
Several bills were introduced during the 105th Congress. The "Pa-
tient Protection Act of 1998" was introduced in the House on July 24,
1998. 57 3 The proposal dealt with access to care, medical savings ac-
counts, and protecting patients' right to choose point of service cover-
569. Health Care Quality: Grievance Procedures, 1998: Hearings Before the Senate
Committee on Labor and Human Resources, 105th Cong. 2 (1998) (statement of Chairman
Jim Jeffords) [hereinafter "Hearings"].
570. Id. at 12 (statement of Olena Berg, Assistant Secretary, Pension and Welfare
Benefits Adm. U.S. Department of Labor).
571. Id. at 13-14 (statement of Margaret A. Hamburg, Assistant Secretary for Planning
and Evaluation of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services).
572. Id. (statement of David Randally, Deputy Director Department of Insurance State
of Ohio; statement of Kathleen Sebelius, Commissioner of Insurance, State of Kansas;
statement of Jack Ehnes, Commissioner of Insurance, State of Colorado).
573. H.R. 4250, 105th Cong. (1998).
Fall 2001 Managed Care Grievance Procedures
394 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges 21-2
age.574 The Act would have required group health plans to provide writ-
ten notice of adverse coverage decisions containing rationale for the de-
cision, written in easily understood language, and within set time lim-
its.575 Review of initial adverse determinations would be permitted.576
External review is not mandatory, but rather is elective. 577 Overall, the
language is cumbersome; the procedures create multiple layers of re-
view, and ultimately leave the patient without a quick and binding proc-
ess.
On January 19, 1999, Senators Kennedy and Daschle introduced a bill
aimed at consumer protection in the managed care arena.578 In addition
to providing federal grants to the states to establish a health insurance
ombudsmen, 579 the bill guaranteed the right of an enrollee to appeal a
denial of coverage,580 mandated an internal appeal with a review by a
physician (or another health care professional with appropriate experi-
ence) who has not previously been involved in the decision making for
the claim,581 a seventy-two hour time frame for expedited reviews and
thirty days for other reviews, 582 and an external appeals process583 that
permitted the insurer to require the patient to exhaust all internal ap-
peals.584 The process itself would provide de novo review by a qualified
external review organization, with similar time frames, and the opportu-
nity for the patient to submit additional evidence.585 The review would
be binding on the insurer.586 Although this bill appeared to provide ade-
quate protection to the patient, it failed to provide an enforcement
mechanism, and seemed to allow existing state laws to take prece-
dence.5 87
The 106th Congress saw the introduction of at least ten bills relating
574. Id.
575. H.R. 4250, 105th Cong. § 1201(a)(3)(B) (1998).
576. H.R. 4250, 105th Cong. § 1201(a)(3)(C).
577. H.R. 4250, 105th Cong. § 1201(a)(4).
578. S. 240, 105th Cong. (1999).
579. S. 240, 105th Cong. § 123 (1998).
580. S. 240, 105th Cong. § 132(a) (1998).
581. S. 240, 105th Cong. § 132(b).
582. S. 240, 105th Cong. § 132(b)(3).
583. S. 240, 105th Cong. § 133 (1998).
584. S. 240, 105th Cong. § 133(a)(3).
585. S. 240, 105th Cong. § 133.
586. S. 240, 105th Cong. § 133(2)(E)(ii).
587. S. 240, 105th Cong. § 192 (1998).
to the provision of health insurance. 588 Congressman Dingell's bill
589
mirrored the Kennedy-Daschle bill introduced in the 105th Congress.
590
Senate Bill Proposal 300, introduced by Senator Lott, provides for a
multi-layered internal and external appeals process. 59 1 External review
would be conducted by a review entity selected by the insurer that is ei-
ther a state agency, a state licensed or credentialed entity, one under con-
tract to the federal government, or one accredited and recognized by "the
Secretary for such purpose." 592 Time frames are provided,593 and the
determination of the external reviewer is binding on the insurer.
594
Penalties for violation of the act include a civil penalty of up to $500.00
per violation.595 However, a maximum of $5,000.00 is set for multiple
violations. 596 The language is unclear as to whether this applies to
individual claims and/or multiple beneficiaries, and over what period the
provision covers. As written, it could reasonably be inferred that a
plan's total liability for multiple violations is $5,000.00, and once that
amount is reached, no civil money penalties may be imposed. This is
problematic, giving less than optimal protection to the public.
House Proposed Legislation, introduced by Congressman Bilirakis
(for himself, Mr. Hastert, Mr. Upton, Mr. Talent, Mr. Goodling, Mr.
Gillmor, Mr. Cunningham, Mr. English, Mr. Goss, Ms. Pryce, Mr. Hill,
Mr. Armey, and Mr. Oxley), 597 also provides time frames for making
initial coverage determinations, decision making by physicians, recon-
sideration determinations, and external review by an independent medi-
cal expert. 598 Unlike some of the other proposals, alternatives to internal
review and external review are allowed. 599 An enrollee may elect an al-
ternative dispute resolution procedure. 600 With respect to the alternative
588. See, e.g., H.R. 197, 106th Cong. (1999); S. 374, 106th Cong. (1999); S. 6, 106th
Cong. (1999); S. 240, 106th Cong. (1999); S. 326, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 216, 106th
Cong. (1999); S. 24, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 448, 106th Cong. (1999).
589. H.R. 358, 106th Cong. (1999) (co-sponsored by 165 Members of Congress).
590. S. 240, 105th Cong. (1999); see also supra note 578.
591. S. 300, 106th Cong. § 503 (1999).
592. S. 300, 106th Cong. § 503(c)(3).
593. S. 300, 106th Cong. § 503(c)(5).
594. S. 300, 106th Cong. § 503(c)(6).
595. S. 300, 106th Cong. § 231(a) (1999).
596. Id.
597. To Provide New Protections Under Group Health Plans, H.R. 448, 106th Cong.
(1999).
598. H.R. 448, 106th Cong. § 1201 (1999).
599. Id.
600. H.R. 448, 106th Cong. § 1201(b)(5) (1999).
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for external review, an enrollee may elect to use a procedure in which
the plan agrees in advance to be bound by the recommendations of an
independent medical expert(s) and the participant agrees to waive (in
advance) any appeal rights. 60 1 Civil penalties are provided for failure to
implement a plan to effectuate the recommendation. 60 2 A maximum of
$500.00 per day (and $1,000.00 per day where bad faith is involved)
may be levied, up to a maximum of $250,000.00.603 If a plaintiff in a
civil action alleges that an individual, acting as a fiduciary, has violated
the terms of the plan and that action results in an adverse coverage de-
termination, the court has the power to order the plan to cease and desist
from its action or its failure to act. Further, the plan may be ordered to
pay costs and reasonable attorney's fees. 6° 4 This bill, like the others,
creates a multi-layered appeals process. Its penalty provisions seem
well-reasoned and likely to encourage compliance with a decision favor-
able to the patient. However, an area of concern relates to the procedure
allowing for an alternative to external review that constitutes a binding
arbitration clause. One wonders what pressure might be applied to in-
duce a patient to accept binding arbitration. A carrier's customer rela-
tions staff could potentially inform a patient that he or she can have a
quick answer by accepting arbitration, without apprising the patient that
there is no appeal from the decision. Perhaps the same customer-
relations staff member would suggest that the arbitration procedure is
less formal and more "user-friendly." Or, perhaps an explanation of the
choices would be too complicated for a sick person to understand when
all he or she really wants is to get coverage for their desired medical
care.
On February 6, 2001, the "Bipartisan Patient Protection Act of 2001"
was introduced in both the House of Representatives and in the Sen-
ate.60 5 It addresses issues including access to emergency care,60 6 the
right of patients to seek treatment by specialists, 60 7 and prescription by
physicians of medications not included in a medical care organization's
601. H.R. 448, 106th Cong. § 1201(b)(6) (1999).
602. Id.
603. H.R. 448, 106th Cong. § 1205(b)(1) (1999).
604. Id.
605. The Bipartisan Patient Act of 2001, H.R. 526, 107th Cong. (2001) and S. 283-284,
107th Cong. (2001) are identical and numbered identically. The following references relate
to both the House and Senate Bills.
606. H.R. 526, 107th Cong. § 113 (2001).
607. H.R. 526, 107th Cong. § 114 (2001).
("MCO") formulary.608 Health insurance companies would be required
to have a utilization review program.60 9 The bill sets forth criteria for
the utilization review program,610 provides procedures for initial
claims, 611 a timeline for decision-making, 612 requirements for the con-
tents of the written decisions, 613 and both an internal and independent
external appeals process.6 14 The external appeals process includes a re-
ferral to a "qualified external review entity" 615 and independent medical
review. 616 The decision of the independent medical reviewer is binding
on the plan.6 17 A patient would be required to exhaust all administrative
remedies provided by Section 102 and Section 103 of the bill before
commencing any civil action.618 In an apparent attempt to rectify the
problems created by ERISA pre-emption, the bill would amend Section
502 of ERISA,6 19 imposing a duty of ordinary care upon any individual
who is a fiduciary of a health insurer and permitting suits where the fail-
ure to exercise ordinary care is the "proximate cause of personal injury"
or death.620 A successful plaintiff would be compensated for both eco-
nomic and non-economic damages. However, punitive damages would
be barred. 621 It appears that these civil liability provisions solve the
ERISA pre-emption problem by permitting civil suits in federal court,
and preserving a patient's right to sue in state court for negligence. A
careful reading of the bill reveals that federal civil suits are permitted
where failure to exercise ordinary care and the resulting injury involves:
a decision "whether an item or service is covered under the terms and
conditions of the plan;"622 or a decision whether the patient is actually
enrolled in the plan (either as a participant or beneficiary);623 or a deci-
sion regarding cost-sharing; or questions dealing with policy limitations
608. H.R. 526, 107th Cong. § 118 (2001).
609. H.R. 526, 107th Cong. § 101 (2001).
610. Id.
611. H.R. 526, 107th Cong. § 102 (2001).
612. H.R. 526, 107th Cong. § 102(b).
613. H.R. 526, 107th Cong. § 102(d).
614. H.R. 526, 107th Cong. §§ 103, 104 (2001).
615. H.R. 526, 107th Cong. § 104(c)(e)(B)(ii).
616. H.R. 526, 107th Cong. § 104(d).
617. H.R. 526, 107th Cong. § 104(f).
618. H.R. 526, 107th Cong. § 302 (2001).
619. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
620. H.R. 526, 107th Cong. § 302.
621. Id.
622. Id. (amending 29 U.S.C. § 1132(n)(1)(a)(i)(I) (1994)).
623. Id. (amending 29 U.S.C. § 1132(n)(1)(a)(i)(II) (1994)).
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regarding the "amount, duration, or scope of coverage of items or ser-
vices." 624 Specifically excluded from the civil remedies provision are
"medically reviewable decisions." 625 These are the decisions subject to
independent external review under the bill.626 The bill preserves the
right to sue in state court under theories of negligence and/or wrongful
death, but prohibits punitive damages unless there is clear and convinc-
ing evidence that the defendant's actions constitute willful and wanton
disregard for the rights of others. 627
All of these proposals are well constructed and make a serious at-
tempt at weighing the rights of both the insurance carrier and the patient.
However, these proposals are all multi-layered and time consuming.
Time is something most patients do not have. Independent review re-
quirements (whether imposed by a state or by the new proposed federal
regulation) still fail because a patient in one state covered by an MCO
may receive the medical care requested, while another patient in another
state requesting the same care and covered by the same MCO may not.
Any solution to the problem needs to provide a fast and easy remedy,
applied to all patients and insurers in a uniform manner, with due proc-
ess afforded to both sides.
V. THE SOLUTION: A STATUTORY FEDERAL DUE PROCESS
HEARING
Let us hark back to the words of George Washington: "Individuals
entering into society, must give up a share of liberty to preserve the rest.
The magnitude of the sacrifice must depend as well on situation and cir-
cumstance, as on the object to be obtained. ' 628 Asking the states to re-
linquish control of the managed care grievance process is a necessary
sacrifice given the goal: uniform standards and uniform application of
those standards for health care coverage determinations. Although there
have been many proposals for a federal appeals procedure for managed
care grievances, including one modeled on the Medicare Appeals proc-
ess, these proposals merely suggest a federal solution without providing
details. 6 2 9
624. Id. (amending 29 U.S.C. § 1132(n)(1)(a)(i)(III) (1994)).
625. Id. (amending 29 U.S.C. § 1 132(n)(2)(B) (1994)).
626. H.R. 526, 107th Cong. § 104(d)(2) (2001).
627. Id.
628. Scheiber, supra note 528.
629. See Hearings, supra note 569; See supra notes 570, 571, 572 (noting statements
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The proposal to model the managed care grievance procedure on the
Medicare Appeals process is a good one,630 but this proposal must be
taken one step further. A statute mandating a federal appeals process for
managed care grievances, that includes a statutory due process hearing
before a U.S. Administrative Law Judge, is a potential answer for pa-
tients. The statute should mandate the assignment of these appeals to
judges serving in the Social Security Administration. These judges are
appointed under 5 U.S.C. § 3105 and may be removed only for good
cause, thus insuring true judicial independence; 631 they are the "func-
tional equivalent" of U.S. District Court judges.632 The duties of the
Social Security Administrative Law Judge include hearing and deciding
disability claims under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act and
hearing and deciding Medicare appeals under Title XVIII of the Social
Security Act.633 These judges receive extensive training in medicine in-
cluding the anatomy of the various body systems, the diseases that attack
them, and diagnostic procedures and treatments. Training commences
upon appointment and continues periodically throughout the judges'
tenure.
634
While much has been written about the statutory basis for hearings
before these judges, little has been put forth concerning the day-to-day
work of a Social Security Administrative Law Judge. At the present
time there are over 1,100 judges serving in 132 hearing offices across
made at the Hearings).
630. See Stayn, supra note 562.
631. 5 U.S.C. § 7521 (1994).
632. Butz v. Economu, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978).
633. This discussion of the duties of the SSA ALI and their training and expertise flow
from the personal knowledge of the author who has served in this capacity since 1981.
634. See Videotape: Video Medical Lectures (Social Security Administration Annual
Conference, 1999). The Agency makes widespread use of videography and interactive video
for training. A full TV studio is maintained in Woodlawn Center, the headquarters of the
Social Security Administration in Baltimore. In addition, the Association of Administrative
Law Judges, the professional association for those of us serving in the Social Security Ad-
ministration, holds an annual conference. Medical education plays a central role in these
conferences. On April 29, 2000, the Social Security Administration released two video
medical lectures recorded at the July 1999 conference (one by Dr. Walter Strausser address-
ing injuries of the upper extremities, including Carpal Tunnel Syndrome and repetitive mo-
tion injuries, rotator cuff surgery, frozen shoulder and Dupuytren's Syndrome, the other by
Dr. Marian Martin and Dr. Richard Jones dealing with functional limitations due to psychiat-
ric impairments) and plans on releasing a total of five. See Memorandum from Acting Di-
rector, Division of Material Resources, Social Security Administration (Apr. 19, 2000)
(unpublished document, on file with the author). This author serves on the curriculum
committee for continuing medical and legal education in Region I that covers the New Eng-
land states.
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the nation. Judges hear cases in their permanent hearing office and at
remote locations in order to accommodate the needs of the public. Dis-
ability hearings generally involve the taking of testimony from an indi-
vidual claimant and may include testimony from a medical expert and a
vocational expert. Depending largely on the location of the hearing of-
fice, these cases comprise approximately seventy-five to ninety percent
of the caseload. The importance of these cases in contributing to the
medical expertise of these judges should not be underestimated. The
judge must ultimately choose among varying medical opinions and se-
lect the one that best describes the claimant's condition and functional
limitations. As a result, the judge needs to keep current on medical di-
agnosis and treatment of disease. In instances where the record is lack-
ing in evidence, the judge has the authority to order a full range of diag-
nostic testing, as long as the test ordered is non-invasive. 635 Thus, the
judge needs to keep current on new diagnostic procedures and their ap-
plication. It is important to keep this in mind when considering the ap-
propriateness of such judges as adjudicators in managed care grievances.
In fact, it is this expertise in general medicine that constitutes the basis
for these judges hearing and deciding Medicare appeals. In Medicare
appeals, the Social Security Administrative Law Judge is called upon to
determine the medical necessity of procedures, the medical necessity for
the purchase of durable medical equipment, the medical necessity for
acute care, and the medical necessity of skilled nursing services, and
home care.636 This caseload comprises ten to twenty-five percent of the
full caseload, again depending on the location of the hearing office.637
These hearings generally involve testimony from providers and testi-
mony from medical experts called by the judge, to assist in an independ-
ent interpretation of the medical evidence. In some cases, most often
those involving durable medical equipment and Medicare managed care
claims, individual beneficiaries also appear. In sum, the Social Security
Administrative Law Judge routinely makes determinations of medical
necessity based upon an application of the law to the medical facts of a
specific case. It is this expertise that lends itself perfectly to the deter-
mination of managed care adverse determinations. State statutes and the
various proposals previously discussed lose sight of the fact that al-
635. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1519a (2001); 20 C.F.R. § 416.919a (2001).
636. Other issues such as overpayments to Medicare providers are not relevant to this
discussion.
637. General knowledge of this author predicated on monthly reviews of national sta-
tistics distributed to judges.
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though a medical determination is essential in all these cases, they are in
fact mixed questions of law and medicine. Each claim in an adverse de-
termination by a managed care entity revolves around a legal interpreta-
tion of the policy provisions and application of those standards to medi-
cal facts. The Social Security Administrative Law Judge makes such
determinations on a daily basis. Any solution to the problem of the
managed care grievance procedures must take into account the fact that
these cases are not exclusively medical decisions, but rather mixed ques-
tions of law and medicine.
The statute proposed in this article would simplify the procedures. It
would require all managed care plans to maintain a single level griev-
ance procedure requiring patients to exhaust all appropriate remedies be-
fore turning to a federal administrative hearing. 638 This internal griev-
ance would have to be completed within five days of the submission of
all relevant medical information in non-emergency situations involving
treatment yet to be provided, and within twenty-four hours in cases of
emergencies. 639 Communication of the decision to the patient and pro-
vider would be required to be communicated immediately, either orally
or electronically, and be confirmed in writing within twenty-four hours
after a decision is made. In cases involving retrospective review, a thirty
day time frame would be set with the same provisions for notification of
the decision.
In the event of an adverse determination, the carrier would be re-
quired to notify the patient and the provider of the right to appeal to a
United States Administrative Law Judge ("AL"), provide information
on how to appeal in clear and concise language, and advise the patient
where the nearest hearing office is located. The notice would contain
information advising the patient and provider of the right to an "imme-
diate" hearing in the event of a life-threatening situation.640 A monetary
638. This would eliminate the multi-layered approach of many state statutes that re-
quire an initial and reconsideration determination before allowing for external appeal, and
the current federal proposals that mirror many state statutes.
639. Some might believe that five days is too short a period, but several of the state
statutes contain even shorter time frames. This author's own experience in hearing and de-
ciding Medicare appeals has been that once all the documentation is received, very little time
is required to reach a decision. Patients awaiting care should not have to wait weeks and
months to learn whether the care will be covered.
640. The mechanism for this could include immediate telephone scheduling with the
Office of Hearings and Appeals (this is the judicial arm of the Social Security Administra-
tion and is known as "OHA") for a hearing within twenty-four hours. As in disability and
Medicare appeals, the patient would retain the right to waive an oral hearing and rely on the
documents.
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threshold would restrict appeals to those matters involving $100.00 or
more. Routine care issues would be scheduled for hearing within thirty
days of the receipt of the request for hearing at the Office of Hearings
and Appeals.64 1 In all cases involving emergencies and/or life threaten-
ing situations, a hearing would be held within twenty-four hours of the
receipt of the request for hearing at OHA. A filing fee of $50.00 in each
case would be required, but would be waived upon a showing of an in-
ability to pay.
The ALJ would be required to make a finding whether the managed
care organization unreasonably refused to provide the service. If the
AU found that the MCO was unreasonable in refusing care, a fine
would be levied against the entity.642 The decision of the ALJ would be
binding on both parties; however, upon a showing of abuse of discretion
by the ALJ, an appeal to the district court would be permitted.643 The
managed care entity would be required to provide care in cases of emer-
gency or life threatening medical situations in the event of an appeal, but
the patient would be liable for repayment in the event that the AL's de-
cision is overturned.
Unlike the disability claims and Medicare appeals, a written decision
would not be required but would be permitted in the event the judge
deemed it appropriate. The ALJ would be required to state the decision,
reciting its rationale on the record at the time of the hearing unless the
record is held open for additional evidence. A form order would then be
issued. The managed care entity would be required to comply with an
order to provide care or services forthwith. Fines and penalties would
be levied for failure to comply. 644
This procedure reduces the number of steps a patient must take.
Many states require the patient to pursue four internal steps before pro-
ceeding to external review (if available at all). In this proposal only a
single internal step is required prior to external review by an AU. This
procedure would provide a binding decision rendered after a due process
hearing. At present only twelve states have binding external review. 645
641. As with all cases in the federal administrative law system, the patient would have
a right to be represented by counsel. However, because the administrative law judge wears
three hats, and is duty bound to protect the rights of the claimant, there is no requirement for
representation. Moreover, these hearings are considered non-adversarial and "user friendly."
642. This money would be used to defray the cost of the appeal.
643. A threshold of $1000.00 would be appropriate to prevent flooding the district
courts with cases.
644. Again, these monies would be used to defray the cost of the appeal.
645. See discussion supra Part IH.A.
On its surface, this proposal may appear to conflict with the general
rule that an ERISA plan administrator is given wide discretion to review,
interpret, and apply the terms of the plan. 646 However, this deference to
the plan administrator is not absolute. As Judge Lucero 647 has noted, the
level of deference may decrease under certain circumstances.648 Given
that the application of the principle of deference is not absolute, and to
avoid a conflict with its application, the statute proposed in this article
would contain a provision limiting such deference. I suggest that for the
purpose of the AU hearing, the judge would be required to accord sig-
nificant weight to the decision of the plan administrator. However,
where the record, as a whole, establishes that the decision is not ade-
quately supported, the judge would be free to accord it little weight. The
same standard would also apply to the opinion of the treating physi-
cian. 649 In either case, the administrative law judge would be required
to explain why he or she did not accord significant weight to either the
opinion of the treating physician or the decision of the plan administra-
tor.
Some of the state statutes controlling grievance procedures allow the
decision of the independent reviewer to be used in other civil proceed-
ings involving the same facts and circumstances while others do not.650
In fairness to the MCO, and to protect the MCO's right to have a jury
trial in negligence actions, I propose that neither party be permitted to
use the decision of the AU in any civil proceeding arising out of the
same facts and circumstances. 651
Some will argue that the volume of cases will be too large for the
Social Security AU's core to handle. However, the data suggests that,
at present, the volume of external review cases is low. As of 1998, the
rate of external review in Medicare was two cases per one thousand
beneficiaries enrolled in managed care per year,652 at a cost of less than
646. See Siemon v. AT&T Corp., 117 F.3d 1173, 1177 (10th Cir. 1997) (discussing this
legal theory).
647. Writing for the majority in Siemon, 117 F.3d at 1173.
648. Siemon, 117 F.3d at 1174.
649. This follows the treating physician rule as it is applied in the context of Medicare
cases in the second circuit. See generally Keefe v. Shalala, 71 F.3d 1060 (2d Cir. 1995).
650. See discussion supra Part II.
651. A similar provision exists with respect to the reports of the National Transporta-
tion and Safety Administration. 49 C.F.R. § 835.4 (2001).
652. Karen Pollitz, External Review Of Health Plan Decisions: An Overview Of Key
Program Features In The States And Medicare, 1998 KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION 18
(document 1443).
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four cents per member per month.653 If the statute were to be properly
promoted, with good notice to plan participants and the general public,
one might expect some increase in numbers over the level of Medicare
appeals. However, it is unlikely that the level would be so high that it
would be unmanageable. At an approximate cost of four cents per mem-
ber per month, 654 it seems a small price to pay for due process.
CONCLUSION
The backlash against managed care has created an environment that
requires action to protect patients' rights. Too often patients who have
been denied care do not appeal the denial, and frequently the patient is
not even aware of what appeal procedures are available. Negligence
suits for damages are an unsatisfactory solution as they often come too
late to help the patient because the patient has died. Moreover, ERISA
has effectively barred most negligence suits, and without an amendment,
this is not a readily available remedy. Although many states have man-
datory grievance procedures, they often require several levels of appeal
(ranging from two to four). This type of process is time consuming and
confusing to a patient in need of care. At the present time, only twenty-
two states have binding external review of an adverse managed care de-
termination. 655 Thus, most patients are without a remedy.
Congress has evinced a clear intent to pre-empt the states and regulate
the provision of health insurance benefits in the context of an employee
welfare benefit plan,656 and has the power to enact legislation. Just as
ERISA was needed "to create uniformity of administration in order to
protect both insurers and beneficiaries from the pitfalls of multiple stan-
dards depending on which state is involved," so too a uniform national
grievance procedure for adverse managed care decisions is needed.657
"[Tihe most efficient way to meet" the needs of all patients enrolled in
managed care health plans "is to establish a uniform administrative
653. Nonpartisan Education and Information Forum on Health Policy Issues in Cali-
fornia: California Health Policy Roundtable: External Review Of Health Plan Decisions
1999 KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION POLICY REPORT (document 1453).
654. Id.
655. As previously noted, depending on the outcome of Moran v. Rush Prudential
HMO, Inc., 230 F.3d 959 (7th Cir. 2000), external review may be preempted by ERISA. See
supra note 231 and accompanying text.
656. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (1994).
657. Jana K. Strain & Eleanor D. Kinney, The Road Paved With Good Intentions:
Problems and Potential for Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance Under ERISA, 31 LOy.
U. CHI. L.J. 29, 58 (1999).
scheme, which provides a set of standard procedures ... *"658
A federal appeals process that provides for a statutory due process
hearing before a Social Security Administrative Law Judge will give pa-
tients a "user friendly" means to appeal adverse determinations. It will
provide an impartial judge trained in both law and medicine to hear and
decide these often life threatening claims quickly, efficiently, and close
to the patient's home.
Finally, it will assure that patients covered by the same MCO, living
in different states, but still seeking the same care, will be treated the
same way.
658. Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 9 (1987).
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